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SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: "CONSENTING"
ADOLESCENTS AND A CONFLICT OF LAWS
Jennifer Ann Drobac*
Abstract: According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, sexual
harassment of adolescents at work may constitute a serious, but to date largely
undocumented, problem. Courts respond inconsistently to adolescent "consent" in sexual
harassment employment cases. This Article reviews state criminal statutory rape law, federal
civil law, and tort law to reveal the conflicting legal treatment of adolescent capacity to
consent to sex. It highlights conflicts not only between the criminal and civil systems, but
also between sister states' laws and laws within states. For example, this Article finds that
despite criminal sexual abuse laws, courts permitted employers to use adolescent "consent"
as a defense to sexual harassment in approximately fifty percent of the surveyed common law
tort cases across the nation. After exploring the public policy goals for these various laws,
this Article concludes that these goals do not justify the blatant conflicts between tort and
criminal laws. This Article recommends both administrative and statutory reform to protect
minors from the predation of adult supervisors and employers. Particularly, it recommends a
strict liability standard in an approach that makes an adolescent's consent to sex with an adult
at work voidable by the minor.
When Sara was fifteen, the forty-year-old manager of the movie
theater where she worked befriended her and gained her confidence. His
attention became increasingly intimate and physical.' At first, she
rebuffed his physical advances. After several months, he told her that he
had a brain tumor and was not sure how long he had to live. He told her
he loved her. When she was sixteen, she agreed to have sexual
intercourse with him. He promoted her to projectionist so that they could
engage in sex more easily and frequently in the secluded projection
room. She was soon pregnant. His adult girlfriend took her to have an
abortion. Her manager was already in jail, serving time on a larceny
conviction. Sara's parents knew nothing about the affair. Sara wrote to
' Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.S.D., Stanford
Law School, 2000. My sincerest gratitude to my readers, Martin Drobac, Esq., Professors Cynthia
Baker, Dan Cole, Robin Craig, Kenneth Crews, Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Andrew Klein, Deborah
Malamud, Antony Page, Florence Roisman, Elaine Sutherland, and R. George Wright, who
reviewed and commented upon earlier drafts. Special thanks to my research assistants, Miriam
Murphy, Associate Director of our library, Margaret Mart, Esq., and Sandie McCarthy-Brown for
their diligent efforts. I also thank Articles Editor Patrick McKenna for his comments and work.
Finally, I am grateful for summer research stipends from Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis that supported this work.
1. Complaint at 3-9, Sara Does v. Culver Theaters (Santa Cruz Super. Ct. 1999) (No. CV139513)
[hereinafter Sara Doe Complaint].
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him, believing he was wrongly convicted. When Sara's parents finally
discovered the cause of her plummeting grades and disturbing behavior,
they notified police, who told Sara the man had no tumor and was a
registered sex offender. Sara cooperated with the district attorney, who
prosecuted him for statutory rape.
Does Sara have a justiciable claim for sexual harassment against the
theater owner?2 This Article explores that question by examining her
case within different legal regimes in numerous states.
This Article explores the laws of several states that address workplace
sexual harassment of adolescents. In particular, it examines the legal
capacity of teenagers 3 to consent to sexual conduct with a co-worker or
supervisor.
Following Part I's introduction of adolescent legal rights and
employment, Part II compares the treatment of adolescent "consent" 4 in
criminal statutory rape prosecutions with multiple interpretations of the
same "consent" in civil disputes. A comparison of state statutory rape
laws, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 5 state fair
employment practice statutes (FEPS), and state personal injury laws
reveals the grossly inconsistent treatment of teenage consent between the
criminal and civil law systems in the United States.
Part III discusses the public policy reasons for particular approaches
to adolescent "consent." This review of the goals of criminal statutory
rape laws and related civil laws highlights the overlapping functions of
each system. It demonstrates that public policy goals may not explain the
varied treatment of adolescent "consent."
2. Professor Deborah Malamud suggested that this is the wrong question with which to start.
Conversation with Deborah Malamud, at the Law & Society Conference, Pittsburgh, Pa. (June 7,
2003). She suggested a regulatory approach to this problem to prevent harassment of minors in the
first place. Id. I agree that a regulatory approach could prove fruitfuil, if combined with litigation and
statutory reform. I explore the possible regulatory approaches in Part V of this Article.
3. While the term "teenager" technically includes eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, I focus on
minors in this Article. I also use the term "adolescents" when referring to minors, even though new
research indicates that adolescence continues into the early twenties. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, I
Can't to I Kant: The Transition to Maturity and the Meaning of Adolescent Consent in the
Workplace 8-9 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Additionally, I refer to both
male and female teenagers, even when I use the female pronoun, because both males and females
experience sexual harassment at work.
4. I use quotations with adolescent "consent" because even explicit verbal consent by a minor
may not constitute legal consent and may equate more realistically with acquiescence. See Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (holding that acquiescence is not consent in an
evaluation of the "unwelcomeness" of sexual conduct under Title VI).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(l) (2000).
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Part IV surveys the civil case law that addresses adolescent "consent"
to sexual conduct. This Part analyzes how courts interpret the law and
how their decisions support or oppose public policy goals. It concludes
that legal treatment of Sara's consent, and her likelihood of prevailing in
a suit for sexual harassment, depends upon the state in which she
consented and files suit, and upon which claims she alleges.
Finally, Part V offers a synthesis of current law and public policy.
Concluding that public policy goals fail to justify the blatant conflict in
the law, this Part explores several options for future treatment of
adolescent "consent" in the workplace. This Part also investigates
possible regulatory approaches, as well as litigation and statutory
reform. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach
and offers a final recommendation: a strict liability standard that makes
adolescent "consent" to sex with an adult at work voidable by the minor.
In sum, this Article suggests how the law might permit Sara to sue for
sexual harassment, whether she "consented" or not.
I. ADOLESCENT LEGAL RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT
A. Adolescent Legal Rights
The law treats adolescents differently than it does adults.6 The U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth7 that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights."8 However, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 the Court
acknowledged:
"[T]here are differences [between children and adults] which
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of
children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this
distinction abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal
6. All states but four set the age of majority at eighteen. In Alabama and Nebraska, persons reach
their majority at nineteen. In Pennsylvania and Mississippi, the age is twenty-one. Heather Boonstra
& Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right To Consent to Health Care, 3 THE GUTrMACHER REP. ON
PUB. POL'Y No. 4, at 7 (The Alan Guttmacher Inst.), at http://www.agi-
usa.org/pubs/journals/gr030404.pdf.
7. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
8. 1d. at 74.
9. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and
in the right to vote and hold office."' 10
The Thompson Court noted many of the legal limitations on the rights of
minors, including eligibility to vote, 11 to serve on a jury, 12 to marry 13 and
drive' 4 without parental consent; to purchase alcohol,' 5 pornographic
materials,' 6 and cigarettes, 17 and to gamble. 18
The Thompson Court's explanation for the different legal treatment of
minors relied in part on legal precedent 19 but also on then-current studies
10. Id. at 823 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
11. The U.S. Constitution grants eighteen-year-olds the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
The Thompson Court noted that no state had lowered its voting age below eighteen. 487 U.S. at 839.
12. In Thompson, the Court noted that no state had granted this right to persons under eighteen.
487 U.S. at 840.
13. Id. at 824. Only Mississippi permits persons younger than eighteen to marry without parental
consent or judicial authorization. See Legal Info. Inst., Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/TableMarriage.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2004). Seven states (Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Oklahoma) allow minors to marry if they are pregnant or have a child. Boonstra & Nash, supra note
6, at 6-7.
14. The Thompson Court noted that in all states but one, the minimum requirement for a driver's
license without parental consent was at least sixteen. 487 U.S. at 842.
15. Id. at 823. By 1988, all states had established a legal minimum drinking age of twenty-one.
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 1087 (4th ed. 2000). In
1984, Congress amended federal law to withhold highway construction funds from states that failed
to impose a minimum drinking age of twenty-one by 1986. Id.; see 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
Research confirms that a disproportionately high percentage of fatal car accidents still involve
teenagers. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra, at 1099-1100; NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN. (NHTSA), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS (1997), at
http://braininjuryoklahoma.org/intro/Transportation/traffic%20safety/20facts%201997.htm#sumar
rys. Mnookin and Weisberg explain, "As a group, teenagers have had the least amount of
experience with either activity [drinking or driving] and thus are more likely to misjudge their
abilities and reactions. They are affected by small amounts of alcohol to a greater degree than more
experienced drinkers." MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra, at 1 100.
16. The Thompson Court stated that no state allowed a minor to purchase obscene materials.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 845; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
17. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report
that in 1998, all states prohibited the sale of tobacco products to minors. CDC, State Laws on
Tobacco Control-United States 1998, 48 MMWR HIGHLIGHTS No. SS-3, at 1 (1999), at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research-data/legaljpolicy/mmwr699fs.htm.
18. The Thompson Court explained that thirty-nine of the forty-eight states that permitted
gambling prohibited participation by minors. Another three prohibit it without the consent of the
parents. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 847.
19. See id. at 834 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)). The Bellotti Court noted three reasons for limiting the rights of children:
"the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." 443 U.S. at 634.
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regarding adolescent psychosocial development.20 The Court concluded
that "[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."'"
The law limits adolescents in many other respects not covered in the
Thompson decision. For example, common law declared that contracts
22with a minor were not void, but were voidable by the minor. This law
remains the majority rule.2 3 In Stanford v. Kentucky,24 the dissent noted
that thirty-seven states restrict a minor's access to general medical
treatment. 5 Many states prohibit minors from filing lawsuits unless
represented by a parent, next friend, or guardian. 6 Additionally, the law
limits the rights of adolescents to work. The federal Fair Labor
Standards Act specifies a minimum work age of fourteen for non-
agricultural work and child labor standards. 7
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 n.43. For a more recent discussion of adolescent psychosocial
development as it relates to sexual harassment law, see Drobac, supra note 3, at 14-16, 22-26.
21. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
22. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 227, at 318 (1952).
23. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 15, at 1081.
24. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
25. Id. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969-70 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Currently, parents retain the legal authority to consent to medical treatment for their
children "based on the principle that young people generally lack the maturity and judgment to
make fully informed decisions before they reach the age of majority." Cynthia Dailard, New
Medical Records Privacy Rule: The Interface with Teen Access to Confidential Care, 6 THE
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y NO. 1, at 6 (The Alan Guttmacher Inst. 2003), at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/joumals/gr060106.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Porter v. Triad of Arizona, 52 P.3d 799, 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a
minor may not bring an action in his own name but may sue through a representative); Am.
Alternative Energy Partners II v. Windridge, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 690-91 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (finding that the incapacity of minors bars them from representing their own interests in
court); Newman v. Newman, 663 A.2d 980, 987 (Conn. 1995) (holding that a child may bring an
action only through a next friend or guardian); Cleaver v. George Staton Co., 908 S.W.2d 468, 669
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (finding a lack of capacity because of the disability of minority pertaining to
the right to sue in one's own name); Jensen ex rel. Stierman v. McPherson, 655 N.W.2d 487, 491
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (relying on WIS. STAT. § 803.01(3)(c) that requires that an adult represent the
minor); see also Klak v. Skellion, 741 N.E.2d 288, 298-90 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that a minor
has no capacity to maintain an action in his name).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 212, 213 (2000); see also Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor in the US: An
Overview of Federal Child Labor Laws, at http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/factl.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2004). Some minimum age exceptions exist for certain jobs such as newspaper
delivery and farm work on the family farm. Child Labor Coalition, supra. Every state also has child
labor laws. When both federal and state laws apply to the employment of a minor, employers must
obey the more stringent of the two laws. Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor in the US: State vs.
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Not all laws treat adolescents as "infants" or as children with a legal
disability. Some laws grant adolescents adult privileges.28 For example,
all fifty states allow minors to consent, without parental approval or
notification, to testing for HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).
Forty-seven states permit minors to consent to treatment for STDs.
29
Thirty-four states permit a minor mother to place her child for adoption
without consulting her own parents.3 ° States also attribute adult
responsibilities to adolescents.3' For example, California automatically
tries a minor of fourteen or older as an adult for the crimes of murder,
rape, and certain other sex offenses.32
This very brief survey of adolescent rights and responsibilities raises
some interesting questions about the relationship between adolescent
employment and sexual activity. We know that the law permits
adolescents to work, albeit with limitations. Additionally, they can
consent to some medical services related to sexual activity, which means
that the law acknowledges that minors engage in sex. 33 However, almost
seventy percent of U.S. adults believe that adolescents fourteen to
sixteen years old should not have sex. 34 IS workplace sex or sexual
Federal Child Labor Laws, at http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/statevsfedlaws.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2004). Federal law allows employers to pay workers under twenty less than
minimum wage for the first ninety days of their employment. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wages, Youth &
Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/youthlabor/wages.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
28. See generally Boonstra & Nash, supra note 6 (providing a useful survey of a minor's right in
all fifty states to consent to various types of health care).
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Dr. Michael J. Bradley discusses the trend to perceive adolescents as adults in his recent
book. MICHAEL J. BRADLEY, YES, YOUR TEEN Is CRAZY! (2002). He writes:
[W]e've somehow come to view adolescents as if they were adults and not children. From the
kid's perspective, this is nothing new. Teenagers of all generations have lobbied for adult
privileges with the swaggering assurances that they can handle "it." The fact is that they cannot
handle "it" and they know this .... What's new is that we've somehow signed onto this
disastrous notion that they are adults, capable of handling "it" completely solo. It's not
working. Teens left on their own as small adults not only screw up big-time, they become
depressed and rageful in the bargain.
Id. at 16-17.
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d)(2), (e) (West 1998). For a discussion of how states treat
juvenile criminal offenders as adults, see Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction ofAdolescence,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 583-86 & nn.140-52 (2000).
33. For a discussion of recent statistics regarding teenage sexuality and sexual harassment, see
Drobac, supra note 3, at 16-25.
34. Jennifer J. Frost et al., The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Country Report for the United States:
In Teenage Sexual and Reproductive Behavior in Developed Countries, at 18 (Occasional Report
No. 8, 2001), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/euroteens_summ.pdf (last visited Apr.
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harassment a problem for minors? May minors legally consent to
workplace sex, or does the law penalize them, or others, if minors
engage in sex with an adult on the job? Can minors sue, through a friend
or guardian, for workplace sexual harassment if they do "consent" to
sex? More specifically, is Sara's case aberrational, and if not, how will
the law treat her circumstances?
B. Adolescent Employment
Researchers estimate that approximately five-and-a-half million
adolescents between the ages of twelve and seventeen work.35
Approximately one-third of working adolescents find jobs in eating and
drinking establishments. Another third work in other retail jobs.
Approximately twenty-five percent work in service industries, including
health, education, and entertainment or recreation jobs.36 Working in a
movie theater, Sara fit into this last category.
1. Youth Employment Generally
Particular individual characteristics correlate with youth employment.
Fifty percent of employed American high school students work more
than fifteen hours per week.37 Black, Hispanic, and poor youth find less
work and are unemployed at higher rates than their white and wealthier
peers.38 Similarly, adolescents in single-parent families experience more
unemployment than those in married-couple families.39  Youth
28, 2004) (reporting that "[i]n 1996, 69% of U.S. adults indicated that it was 'always wrong' for
adolescents between the ages of 14-16 to have sex").
35. Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor in the US: Youth Employment Statistics, at
http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
Youth Employment Statistics]. The Report on the Youth Labor Force states that 2.9 million
adolescents aged fifteen to seventeen worked during the school months in the period 1996-1998.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Report on the Youth Labor Force 30 (Nov. 2000), at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/rylf/rylfhome.htm [hereinafter Report on the Youth Labor Force]. During
the summers, that figure rose to 4.0 million. Id. Unless otherwise specified, all future employment
statistics discussed in this article refer to the period 1996-1998.
36. Report on the Youth Labor Force, supra note 35, at 36; Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor in
the US: Industries and Occupations Where Youth Are Employed, at
http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/indandocc.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
37. Youth Employment Statistics, supra note 35.
38. Report on the Youth Labor Force, supra note 35, at 15. The report did not mention the
employment rates of Asian or other U.S.-bom minorities.
39. Id. at 33. Adolescents in married-couple families experienced fifteen percent unemployment
during the 1996-1998 period as compared to almost double that (twenty-nine percent) for those in
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unemployment rates typically far exceed those for other groups,
averaging between fifteen and thirty-five percent, depending on age,
race, family type, and time of year.40 Most recent figures from 2002
concerning sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds show that while
approximately twenty-seven percent were employed, another nineteen
percent sought work.41 The question arises whether adolescent workers,
because they experience more unemployment than adults, are therefore
more susceptible than their adult co-workers to sexual abuse and
coercive demands by employers and supervisors.4 2
households headed by single women and twenty-three percent for those in households headed by
single men. Id. The survey did not mention children of gay and lesbian families or children in
households headed by unmarried domestic partners.
40. Id. at 31. The annual average unemployment rate of fifteen to seventeen-year-olds during the
1996-1998 period hovered at nineteen percent. Id. at 33. School-month unemployment averaged at
seventeen percent for whites, thirty-five percent for Blacks, and thirty percent for Hispanics. Id. at
31. Male unemployment rates were slightly higher than those for females, twenty percent compared
to seventeen percent. Id.
41. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, tbl. 3, Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population by Age,
Sex, and Race 196, at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat3.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). The exact
figures were twenty-seven percent employed and nineteen percent unemployed for that age group.
Id.
42. Professor Robin Craig notes that adolescent unemployment may not carry the same import as
adult unemployment and suggests that I may not be exploring the right question here. In a May
2003 presentation, I suggested to Professor Craig and other colleagues that new research concerning
adolescent neurological and psychosocial development may dramatically change what we "know"
about adolescence. In a draft paper based upon that research, I summarize that "[c]ritical abilities-
including impulse control, emotional regulation, planning, decision-making, and organization-may
not fully mature until the third decade of life." Drobac, supra note 3, at 9. I believe, and Professor
Craig shares the view, that adolescent development makes minors more vulnerable than adults to
workplace sexual harassment. I explored this notion more fully in that paper. See id. at 4-26.
Thus, Professor Craig wonders whether adolescents may suffer higher rates of sexual harassment
not because of associated high unemployment rates but because of these maturational vulnerabilities
and limited experiences in the workplace. She is skeptical of the importance of adolescent
unemployment rates because people, thinking that adolescents should be in school and not at work,
may discount those statistics. Moreover, most minors are dependents. Because they are not
responsible for paying for their own necessaries, Professor Craig suggests that work is less critical
to them and, by implication, these adolescents will tolerate less harassment. I think both
maturational vulnerabilities and high unemployment rates may influence the prevalence of the
sexual harassment of teen workers. In any case, the significance of adolescent unemployment and
its relevance to sexual harassment deserves further investigation.
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2. Youth Sexual Harassment in the Restaurant Industry
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge43
statistics tend to support the notion that those industry sectors that
employ more teen workers receive a high percentage of EEOC
discrimination charges. For example, in 2002, the EEOC received 268
sexual harassment charges from workers under eighteen.4 Of those,
forty-six percent (123) came from adolescents who worked in eating and
drinking establishments.45 This statistic marks more than a ten percent
increase in five years over the 1998 figure, in which only thirty-five
percent of the charges came from teen workers in this industry.46
EEOC lawsuits document sexual harassment of youth in the
restaurant industry. In 2002, the EEOC filed eighteen sexual harassment
lawsuits against restaurants,47 including Taco Bell, Church's Chicken,
Applebee's, Denny's, Colonial Ice Cream, Pepe's Mexican Restaurant,
and others.48 One cannot always tell from EEOC press releases whether
the alleged targets were minors at the time the incidents occurred;
nevertheless, two EEOC press releases from 2003 documented the
sexual harassment of female teenagers at Burger King, Church's
43. 1 use the term "charge" rather than "complaint" to distinguish EEOC administrative charges
(filed to initiate EEOC investigations) from lawsuit complaints (filed to initiate a court action).
44. ORIP/PPAD, EEOC, EEOC/FEPA Charge Trends for 17 and Under Sexual Harassment
Receipts by Charging Party Group--National (EEOC computer-generated statistics compiled on
May 27, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter EEOC National 17 and Under Receipts]. I thank
EEOC administrators and employees who provided me with the information discussed in this
section and the footnotes that follow.
45. ORIP/PPAD, EEOC, EEOC/FEPA Charge Trends for 17 and Under Sexual Harassment
Receipts by Charging Party Group--SIC: Eating and Drinking Places (EEOC computer-generated
statistics compiled on May 30, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter EEOC Eating and Drinking
17 and Under Receipts].
46. EEOC National 17 and Under Receipts, supra note 44; EEOC Eating and Drinking 17 and
Under Receipts, supra note 45. According to EEOC trial attorney Sanya Hill Maxion, the EEOC
processed 1281 sexual harassment cases filed by workers eighteen or under in 1994. Alexei
Oreskovic, Targeted Teens, THE RECORDER, July 15, 2003, at 1. The Oreskovic article also states
that for the year 2003, minors had filed 541 cases, ninety-nine percent of which involved sexual
harassment, Id. The EEOC statistics provided by the Commission refute that estimate: as of May 27,
2003, minors had filed only 133 sexual harassment cases in 2003. EEOC National 17 and Under
Receipts, supra note 44.
47. Mary Sanchez, Fast-Food Industry Serves Up Sexual Harassment, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, May 10, 2003, at 8.
48. Dina Berta, Sexual Harassment Remains Nagging Issue for Foodservice Industry, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 16, 2002, at 1.
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Chicken,49 Jack-in-the-Box, and Taco Bell. 50  According to EEOC
District Director Lynn Y. Bruner, no other industry receives as many
complaints or sees as many cases filed in the civil court system.5'
Is there a correlation between teen employment and sexual
harassment charges more generally? The answer to this question remains
unclear. We do know that in recent years workers filed more than 1200
discrimination charges annually against restaurants, the sector that
52employs one-third of all adolescents. Thus, we know that minors filed
approximately ten percent of the eating and drinking industry sexual
harassment charges. The problem is that we do not know exactly what
percentage of the industry workforce teenagers comprise.
53
New anecdotal evidence of the sexual harassment of adolescent
workers, particularly in the fast food industry, has alerted EEOC
officials to what may be an alarming phenomenon and trend.54 For
example, on January 31, 2003, the St. Louis Post Dispatch reported the
case of a Burger King manager who sexually harassed six women, five
of whom were high school students.55 The manager, in his late twenties,
49. This case alleged the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl by her store manager. Sanchez, supra
note 47, at 8.
50. Press Release, EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charged at Cannery Row Restaurant (Apr. 10,
2003) (on file with author); Press Release, EEOC, Two Victims To Share $85,000 For Sex
Harassment by Company Founder (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with author).
5 1. Sanchez, supra note 47, at 8.
52. Berta, supra note 48.
53. The U.S. Department of Labor reports that 2,573,000 sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
worked in 2000. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Household Data Annual Averages, in CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY (2000), at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rylf/rylfhome.htm. It does not report the work statistics
of fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds. Id. The number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds represented
approximately two percent of the total employed workforce. Id. I could not find Department
statistics that break down that figure by industry. If, however, the percentage holds for the eating
and drinking industry (which it may not since that sector employs one third of all teenagers) then
two percent of the workers filed ten percent of the sexual harassment charges.
54. Telephone Interview with David Grinberg, Spokesperson, EEOC (May 22, 2003); E-mail
from William Tamayo, Regional Attorney, EEOC, San Francisco to author (May 22, 2003, 7:06
p.m. CST) (on file with author) ("Our office has litigated a few cases involving teenagers subjected
to sexual harassment, and we see a growing trend."); see also Oreskovic, supra note 46, at I
("Among the millions of teenagers who staff the nation's fast food and retail outlets, sexual
harassment is a pervasive problem that's long existed under the radar."). EEOC Program Analyst
Linda Li notes that the agency "has not consistently tracked the age of the harassment victims." E-
mail from Linda Li, Program Analyst, EEOC, to author (May 22, 2003, 5:18 p.m. CST) (on file
with author). Growing awareness of this phenomenon may cause more detailed tracking of the
sexual harassment of adolescent workers.
55. Peter Shinkle, Restaurant Manager Is Accused of Harassing Workers; EEOC Official Voices
Concern About Teen Workers, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 2003, at B2.
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allegedly fondled the workers, made vulgar comments, and demanded
sex. Initially, the women did not know how to make a complaint to
someone more senior than their manager.
In the EEOC press release concerning the Burger King case, Lynn
Bruner expressed her concern for vulnerable adolescents in the
restaurant industry. She commented, "We as a society fail when
teenagers-as part of their first employment experience-are subjected
to graphic language, inappropriate touching, and requests for sexual
favors by the very adults who are supposed to make sure they're safe."
57
She further explained that sexual harassment may be a particular
problem in the restaurant industry because restaurants often hire young,
inexperienced workers.58 High employee turnover contributes to the
problem, presumably because of monitoring difficulties and the need to
train new employees continually.5 9  Bruner also suggested that
"restaurants often try to create an 'entertainment atmosphere' that can
cloud the rules for appropriate conduct in the workplace.' 6 °
3. Youth Sexual Harassment Generally
San Francisco Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center staff
attorney David Pogrel agreed that teenagers face unique risks, stating:
Teenagers on the job are often seen as fungible. A lot of
employers don't treat them with the same respect [as adult
workers] .... I think that sort of runs over into a whole myriad
of rights that are often violated on behalf of young workers-not
getting paid correctly and sexual harassment among young
women.
61
56. EEOC Regional Attorney William R. Tamayo explained that many young workers may not
know their rights. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Settles Sex Harassment Suit with Fresno Chain
Uncle Harry's Bagels (Mar. 13, 2003) (on file with author). On March 13, 2003, the EEOC settled a
sexual harassment case against a Fresno, California-based chain, Uncle Harry's Bagels. Id. A store
manager allegedly sexually harassed several teenaged workers, among other employees. Id. Uncle
Harry's agreed to pay $150,000 to the six female victims. Id. According to Sanya Hill Maxion,
teens may not recognize sexual harassment and may not know what to do when they experience it.
Oreskovic, supra note 46, at 1.
57. Shinkle, supra note 55, at B2.
58. Id.
59. Sanchez, supra note 47, at 8.
60. Shinkle, supra note 55, at B2.
61. Oreskovic, supra note 46, at 1.
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Adolescents face this treatment at a time in their development when they
are learning new interpersonal skills and how to function in a workplace
environment. They may not yet understand the boundaries between what
may be appropriate outside the workplace but illegal within it.
62
Sexual harassers prey upon teens in other workplace sectors, not just
restaurants. In 1999, the EEOC filed suit against Footaction USA. A
manager in his late thirties allegedly sexually harassed a teenaged
employee. The manager, co-workers, and customers subjected the
teenager to sexual jokes, propositions, and threats, culminating in a
physical assault. San Francisco EEOC District Director Susan L.
McDuffie commented:
Several incidents of sexual harassment of minors have been
brought to our attention this year .... Sexual harassment-at
what is very often the teenaged employee's first job-can have a
devastating psychological effect, causing the victim to feel
shame, to change the way she dresses, to drop out of school, and
to be afraid to tell anyone what is happening. We hope this suit
will send two messages. Employers must have zero tolerance for
sexual harassment. In addition, teens should know they have a
right to report unwelcome, offensive sexual conduct whether by
a customer, co-worker, or supervisor, and that if they come to
the EEOC, we will take action.63
In this passage, McDuffie raised several important points. First, she
acknowledged the phenomenon of teen harassment. Second, she briefly
explored sexual harassment's devastating effects on adolescents and
mentioned their fear of reporting harassment. Third, she called for zero
tolerance by employers in order to protect these teens. Fourth, she
emphasized the need for teens to know their rights and that the EEOC
responds to complaints. This fourth point supports the notion that some
teens do not know their rights and fail to understand that an agency
exists to help them.
4. Empirical Research Needed
This anecdotal evidence highlights the need for immediate,
comprehensive empirical research in this field. We need to know the
prevalence and scope of the sexual harassment of working adolescents.
62. Id.; see also Drobac, supra note 3, at 14-16.
63. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Footaction USA for Sexual Harassment of Teen Employee
(Sept. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
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We know, for example, that eighty-three percent of girls and seventy-
nine percent of boys report experiencing sexual harassment at school.64
In the workplace, is sexual harassment of teenagers as pervasive as
sexual harassment of adults? Is it even more pervasive? We must
determine whether the presence of adolescent workers in an industry
correlates with high numbers of sexual harassment charges. Specifically,
do harassers target teens rather than adult workers? An investigation into
adolescent harassment will lead to other, more sophisticated questions.
For example, if sexual harassment of teenagers is pervasive, do they
tolerate harassment and, if so, why? Are they ignorant of their rights?
Are they immobilized by shame? Is it shame or do they fear economic
retaliation, or even physical violence? The American Academy of Child
& Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) suggested in a policy statement: "It
is common for children and adolescents to conceal these offenses [sexual
harassment] because they feel afraid, ashamed, vulnerable, and
humiliated. They may actually believe their own behavior may have
precipitated the sexual harassment. These incidents are often not
revealed for many years, if ever."
65
The conduct of Sara, whose story begins this Article, supports this
statement. She concealed her manager's abuse and her resulting trauma
from her parents.66 She later reported feeling humiliation and shame.6 7
Had the manager not continued to telephone her from prison, Sara's
parents might never have discovered the cause of her plummeting grades
and bizarre behavior.
68
The AACAP statement raises other questions. To what extent do
teenagers fail to report harassment? If teenagers are not complaining, do
they have unique coping techniques? Do they "consent" to sexual
activity and then complain? Is Sara's case unique? Answers to these
questions will enable jurists, educators, healthcare professionals, and
64. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing, and Sexual Harassment in
School 4 (2001), at
http://www.aauw.org/member-center/publications/HostileHallways/hostilehallways.pdf.
65. Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Policy Statement-Sexual Harassment (Oct.
1992), at http://www.aacap.org/publications/policy/ps28.htm.
66. Report of Deputy R. Mitchell #73-2801, Aug. 9, 1999, at 3-4 (on file with author & Santa
Cruz County Sheriff's Department) [hereinafter Mitchell #73-2801].
67. Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
68. Mitchell #73-2801, supra note 66, at 4; Jail Incident Report #99-R-174, Aug. 16, 1999, at 1-2
(on file with author & Santa Cruz County Sheriffs Department).
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employers to address problems through training, counseling, and legal
reform.
While the answers to these questions are important, we can take the
anecdotal and EEOC statistical evidence to explore how the law
currently treats or fails to address the sexual harassment of adolescents.
Additionally, we can explore the public policy reasons for addressing
teen sexual harassment. For, as one news reporter noted: "From a legal
standpoint, the fast-food industry is liable for alleged incidents. But this
is a societal problem. At its most basic level it is an issue of respect.
What a sad commentary on American society that so little respect is
afforded young women.,
69
If society truly affords our children-transitioning into adults-so
little respect, if employers treat adolescent workers as fungible, then
public policy and the law should address the situation.
II. ADOLESCENT "CONSENT" TO SEX-HISTORIC AND
CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT
The criminal and civil legal systems deal with adolescent "consent" to
sex in different ways. Statutory rape laws dominate the criminal field.
The civil system addresses such consent through state tort laws, Title
VII, state FEPS, and other statutory responses. By comparing the varied
approaches, one sees the gross legal inconsistencies.
A. Statutory Rape Laws
Historically, statutory rape laws defined "the age of consent" as a
girl's age at which her consent to sexual intercourse earned legal
significance and insulated the male participant from criminal
prosecution.70 During the nineteenth century, states raised the age of
consent from ten to as high as twenty-one.7' Currently, all fifty states
prohibit the sexual predation of minor females by adults.72 As late as
69. Sanchez, supra note 47, at 8. This reporter's assertion regarding employer liability is
inaccurate. Employers become liable only when the complainant proves that the harassment and
damages occurred. Moreover, liability may not attach if a teen "consents."
70. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24-25 (1994).
71. Id. at 24.
72. App. A, infra pp. 546-73; Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In
Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 41-78 (1997); see also Oberman, supra note 70, at
22-36.
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1994, only thirty-five states had gender neutral laws protecting both
male and female minors.73 Now, all fifty states protect both sexes.74
In 1997, Charles A. Phipps surveyed state sex crime laws and found
that most states distinguish among sex crimes against children by the
severity of the offense and the age of the child. 75 He concluded that most
states classify crimes against children under thirteen or fourteen as the
most serious.76 The least serious were non-forcible sex crimes with older
children.77 An age difference of at least two to five years was an element
of a sex crime in most states.78
Because of the complexity of these laws, I found it difficult to
pinpoint a definitive "age of consent." Some states set a baseline age of
consent but then increase the age when a case involves special facts,
such as an adult in a position of trust or authority, a relative, or a school
employee. For example, four states set the age at fourteen but increase it
to sixteen under special circumstances. 79 Twenty states increase the age
from their respective bases to eighteen under special circumstances. 80 If
73. Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 492 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas protected only female minors
from predation by males. Oberman, supra note 70, at 32 n.88.
74. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73.
75. Phipps, supra note 72, at 55-62; see also Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On
Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 373
app. A (2003). 1 disagree with some of Mr. Phipps' conclusions regarding the age of consent in his
more recent work. I have noted my own conclusions concerning the age of consent in App. A, infra
pp. 546-73.
76. Phipps, supra note 72, at 57. Phipps also discussed the Model Penal Code's treatment of sex
crimes and highlighted its gendered approach. Id. at 18-19. Moreover, the Model Penal Code sets
the age of consent at ten-an age no longer adopted by any state. Phipps explains, "The drafters
were worried about the seductive powers of adolescents as well as the application of a rule of strict
liability and they wanted to draw a clear line for the most serious offense." Id. at 19 (citing MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 6 at 324 (1985)).
77. Id. at 59-60. The age of consent for sexual contact, as opposed to penetration, was lower in
most states. Seventeen states set the age of consent for sexual contact at fifteen or below. Another
twenty-two set it at sixteen. Id. at 62.
78. See id. at 62 & n.252; Oberman, supra note 70, at 32. Some states set age minimums for
culpability. Phipps, supra note 72, at 62-63 & n.248 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434(a)(1)
(Michie 1996)).
79. See App. A, infra pp. 552, 557, 560, 568 (summarizing the laws for Hawaii, Maryland,
Mississippi, and South Carolina).
80. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73 (summarizing the laws for Alaska (16), Arkansas (16),
Colorado (15), Connecticut (16), Delaware (16), Florida (16), Iowa (14), Illinois (17), Maine (14),
Michigan (16), Minnesota (16), New Hampshire (16), New Jersey (16), New Mexico (17),
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one takes the highest age in each state, then twenty-seven states set the
age of consent at eighteen, five at seventeen, and eighteen at sixteen.8'
These laws demonstrate that almost half of the states set the age of
consent at below the age of majority. Only fourteen percent of the states
(seven) set it at the age of majority absent special circumstances. 82
Many states recognize an enhancement of the offense when a member
of the family or another adult in a position of authority commits the
offense.83 Teachers and other school employees, guardians, babysitters,
employers and shift supervisors, psychotherapists, and medical
professionals are all examples of persons who wield authority over
adolescents.84
While statutory rape is a strict liability offense, a few states retain
now uncommon elements of the offense or unusual defenses. For
example, in California, mistake of age, particularly of older victims,
constitutes a defense.85 In Massachusetts, chastity remains an element of
the crimes against older children. 86 Thus, if the child was not virginal at
the time of the offense, the perpetrator may use that as a complete
defense to the crime of statutory rape.
Oklahoma (16), South Dakota (16), Tennessee (13), Utah (16), Vermont (16), and Washington
(16)).
81. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73.
82. Id.
83. Id.; Phipps, supra note 72, at 66-69; see also Michelle Qberman, Regulating Consensual Sex
with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 767-68 (2000). As Phipps
explains, the Model Penal Code creates an offense by one in a position of authority but narrowly
defines that position and excludes the teacher-student relationship. Phipps, supra note 72, at 23-24.
The 1980 commentary to the Model Penal Code explains, "Coverage of every instance of sexual
relations with an employee, student, or other person under one's supervision would reach too far."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. 4, at 389 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Phipps, supra note 72, at 68 n.264; see also Doe v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979 (D. Nev.
1996) (finding that school-aged children are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse by an adult in a
position of authority). The Estes court determined that "[s]choolchildren are particularly vulnerable
to mistreatment at the hands of adults, especially where those adults are cloaked with the authority
of the state." 926 F. Supp. at 988; see also infra note 315 and accompanying text.
85. Phipps, supra note 72, at 51-52 & n.219.
86. Id. at 70-71 & n.275 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 4 (West 1990); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-3-67, -5-21 (1994)). In 1998, Mississippi repealed laws requiring that the target be
"chaste." See MISs. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (1999).
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1. A Case Example: Hernandez v. State
Until 1993 in Texas, the perpetrator could argue capacity to consent
to sex based on a promiscuity defense.87 In Hernandez v. State,88 the
court emphasized:
We do observe that the State's brief acknowledges "that children
aged fourteen to seventeen who have voluntarily become
sexually active are, unlike their sexually inactive peers, imputed
by the law with the capacity to consent to sexual conduct like an
adult." It then adds, "Stated conversely, the law which imputes
to children an incapacity to consent to sexual activity makes a
logical exception for those in their mid-teens who have chosen
to become sexually active." 89
The court did not explain exactly how sex, or more specifically, the
choice to have sex, elevates a minor's legal capacity to that of adult with
full maturity, understanding, and appreciation.
Did the law really impute capacity because these minors made a
choice? Did the law assume that every teenager who "chooses" to have
sex weighs the decision carefully, considering all the potential
ramifications? The court's reasoning flies in the face of our common
understanding of teenage passion, sex, and willingness to engage in risky
behavior.90 The chastity and promiscuity defenses attribute full capacity
to minors. What about the Hernandez facts? The minor's mother
allegedly "sold" her daughter to the accused rapist and other men.
91
Perhaps, the minor's "choice" not to resist the accused reflected a well-
reasoned decision, but I would hardly attribute to her adult status based
on those facts.
To follow this reasoning further, let us ask why both the prosecution
and the court suggested that the law made a logical exception for
sexually active teens. If teen virgins suffer incapacity, shouldn't the law
protect them from their own naive and misguided choices? Why would
the law credit their choice to have sex in the first place? If the law places
87. Hernandez v. State, 861 S.W.2d 908, 909-10 (Tex. 1993) (finding that § 22.01ll(d)(1) of the
Texas Penal Code permits the accused to raise a statutory promiscuity defense in a case in which the
minor's mother "sold" her to the accused and other men). The Texas legislature deleted this defense
when it revised the penal code in 1993. Id. at 910 (Miller, J., concurring).
88. 861 S.W. 2d 908 (Tex. 1993).
89. Id. at 909 n. 1; see also Oberman, supra note 70, at 33.
90. For a discussion of teenage sexuality, see Drobac, supra note 3, at 16-22.
91. Hernandez, 861 S.W.2d at 910 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
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such responsibility and resulting consequences on fourteen- to
seventeen-year-olds, if it affords their perpetrators the ability to invite a
promiscuity defense, then it is not logical to keep statutory rape laws on
the books for youth over thirteen.
92
Another interpretation of the Hernandez court's reasoning is that the
law imputed capacity because sex elevates minors to a new level of
understanding. One could argue, using this reasoning, that if we simply
introduced all of our teenaged children to sex, they would all develop
adult wisdom and legal capacity. Unlikely.
The law in Hernandez reflected adult prejudice. Some adult
lawmakers in Texas thought that teenaged children who chose to have
sex chose an immoral path and were, therefore, promiscuous and bad.
They did not reward or protect bad minors in Texas. In fact, they let
adults who raped them avoid punishment. The promiscuity defense,
which reflected this adult prejudice, died only ten years ago in Texas. 93
Did the prejudice die with it? I doubt it.
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 412
The chastity and promiscuity defenses clearly contradict the
provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and parallel state statutes
that specifically prohibit introduction of the victim's prior sexual
history.94 When courts fail to invoke Rule 412 (or similar state
equivalents) 95 to protect the sexual history of minor victims, then any
evaluation of a minor's maturity could conceivably include a discussion
of the minor's sexual maturity and sexual history. This circumstance
leaves minors vulnerable to the grossest procedural abuses that
legislators intended Rule 412 (and state equivalents) to combat. 96
92. I thank Professor R. George Wright for clarifying this point.
93. See Hernandez, 861 S.W.2d at 910 (Miller, J., concurring).
94. Phipps, supra note 72, at 70 n.275; see FED. R. EVID. 412 & advisory committee's note. But
see Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337, 1342-43 (Ind. 1992) (holding that in a tort action, the
Indiana Rape Shield Statute did not preclude the defendant from introducing evidence of plaintiffs
other sexual activities); Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg County Sch. Dist., 495 S.E.2d 230, 233 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding that the South Carolina rape shield statute did not apply in civil cases).
95. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 1995); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513 (West 1992).
96. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 849 (1991) (arguing that
exposure of a woman's sexual history will "lead not only to shame in the courtroom but
acquiescence in the workplace").
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Because Sara lived in California, a state that sets the age of consent
for penetration at eighteen,97 the District Attorney successfully
prosecuted a statutory rape charge.98 Her manager could not raise
mistake of age as a defense. He knew (or should have known) her age
from her work permit, which California required her to obtain from her
school. Had Sara lived in twenty-four other states, however, her
"consent" would have insulated the manager from prosecution because
she was sixteen, the "age of consent" in those other states, by the time
the manager actually seduced her.99 Thus, the state in which she
consented and where the District Attorney prosecuted the claim made a
difference in her case.
B. Title VII and State Fair Employment Practice Statutes (FEPS)
Title VII prohibits discrimination against any individual "with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'' ° In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 10° the Court held that
severe or pervasive sexual harassment violates Title VII when it alters
the worker's conditions of employment and creates an abusive working
environment. 102 Courts assess the working environment by "'looking at
all of the circumstances' including the 'frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance."" 10
3
In order to bring a case of sexual harassment against an employer
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West 1999).
98. See People v. Cosio, No. S9-09852 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. 1999).
99. Absent the special facts of her case (e.g., the age disparity and Cosio's managerial position),
the number of states that would not protect her increases to thirty-six. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998).
101. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
102. Id. at 67. Professor Catharine MacKinnon defined sexual harassment as "the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to the
concept is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations
in another." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
103. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
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class; 104 (2) unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) harassment based on sex;
(4) an effect on the terms or conditions of employment; and (5) direct or
indirect employer liability. 10 5 No claim against individual perpetrators
exists under Title VII. 10 6 However, some state FEPS permit sexual
harassment damage claims against individual harassers.10 7 In Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton,10 8 the Court emphasized that the "objectionable
environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the
victim in fact did perceive to be so."'1 9 Jurists refer to the objective
component as the "reasonableness" standard and to the subjective
element as the unwelcomeness requirement. Every state FEPS that
similarly prohibits sex discrimination and sexual harassment also makes
"unwelcomeness" an element of the prima facie case.1" 0
The Meritor Court specifically addressed the issue of volition in its
discussion of unwelcomeness:
While the question whether particular conduct was indeed
unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns
largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of
fact, the District Court in this case erroneously focused on the
'voluntariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed
sexual episodes. The correct inquiry is whether respondent by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual
intercourse was voluntary. I I I
Thus, acquiescence to sex is not consent. The plaintiff must prove only
that she somehow indicated that the sexual behavior was unwelcome." 12
104. Under Title VII, both male and female workers enjoy protection from sexual harassment by
members of either sex, as long as the harassment is "because of... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
105. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982).
106. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993).
107. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (1992); Matthews v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d
350, 351 (1995); Page v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 532 (1995).
108. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
109. id. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
110. See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940.
111. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
112. Cf T.L. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 605 A.2d 1125, 1135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (finding
that unwelcomeness is an implicit requirement for sexual harassment and that consent will not
negate this element as a matter of law and holding that "[t]he issue is one of fact, dependent on the
surrounding circumstances").
490
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One can see how the unwelcomeness requirement, absent invocation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (or a similar state statute in combination
with a FEPS claim), could lead to the trial of the plaintiff s conduct."1 3
Title VII and the FEPS make clear that legislators either neglected
adolescent workers when they drafted these laws or knowingly created a
glaring conflict between state criminal statutory rape laws and civil
antidiscrimination laws. In every state, fifteen-year-old workers lack the
capacity in a criminal context to consent to sexual intercourse with a
twenty-one-year-old supervisor, but these civil rights laws assume that
capacity by making no mention of adolescents. How did this blatant
inconsistency pass inspection? This Article reviews the public policy
motivating these laws, 1 4 but my guess is that legislators simply forgot
adolescent workers.'1 15
Can Sara successfully sue for sexual harassment under
antidiscrimination laws? The real question is whether she can prove that
her manager's sexual attention was unwelcome. At first glance, she
cannot. She "consented" to sex after initially rebuffing the manager's
advances. Does her ultimate "consent" negate the initial rebuff?.
Probably not.1 6 However, she continued to write to her lover while he
was in jail.1 17 Not until she learned that he had lied to her and was a
registered sex offender did she again declare his attention unwelcome.
1 18
113. See DEBORAH RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 102-04 (1997). Professor Rhode explains:
Although recent reforms seek to restrict disclosures of a complainant's prior sexual
experiences, such evidence is still admissible at trial if the judge decides that its value to a
defendant substantially outweighs harm to the complainant. Moreover, in pretrial proceedings,
attorneys have greater freedom to ask intimate questions, and can often grill victims about their
sex lives, birth control practices, and counseling histories. If a plaintiff alleges physical or
psychological damage resulting from harassment, opposing attorneys can explore possible
alternative causes for her distress-everything from closeted lesbian experiences to intimate
marital difficulties. As a result, defendants' lawyers can discredit or deter a harassment
complaint with harassing tactics of their own.
Id. at 102.
114. See infra Part III.
115. A review of the legislative history of Title VII reveals no mention of adolescents. See 110
CONG.REC. 2577-84, 2718-21, 2728, 2804-05, 13825, 13837-38, 14511, 15896-97 (1964).
116. Cf In re Neal, 179 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) (holding that consent to sexual
relations will not negate, as a matter of law, a prior ineffective consent to sexual relations).
117. Letters from Sara Doe to Michael Cosio (July 18, 1999-Aug. 25, 1999), Report No. 99-7955
(No. S9-09852) (on file with author & Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, Records Division).
118. See, e.g., Sara Doe Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
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C. State Personal Injury and Other Tort Claims
Some sexual harassment targets look to common law tort claims, in
addition to antidiscrimination laws, for relief." 9 However, most common
law intentional tort claims depend upon the plaintiffs subjective offense
and an absence ofconsent120 under the maxim volenti nonfit injuria ("a
person is not wronged by that to which he or she consents").'12
Additionally, consent may trigger defenses to negligence-based tort
claims, such as contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and
assumption of risk.122 Finally, many state FEPS provide the exclusive
state law remedy for workplace sexual harassment and preempt state
common law tort claims. 2 3  Thus, most "consenting" targets of
workplace sexual harassment either cannot avail themselves of common
law tort claims or face a trial of their own conduct when they bring
common law claims against harassers.
1. Common Law Doctrine and Remedies
Common law was not, historically, without its remedies. Early
American civil claims for sexual predation took the form of the writ of
119. See, e.g., Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL
327906, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
120. KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTION OF TORT LAW 32-35 (1997). 1 thank
Professor Andy Klein for emphasizing the need to distinguish between intentional torts and
negligence claims, and for exploring with me the relevance of consent to these different claims.
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999) (referring also to assumption of risk); see
also Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REv. 817, 860 (1996).
122. See infra Part II.C. Cf Detmer v. Bixler, 642 N.W.2d 170, 176-77 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002)
(affirming rejection of negligence claims because minor consented to sexual intercourse and,
therefore, no tort claim existed against her partner). See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 120, at
137-58.
123. See, e.g., Geise v. Phoenix Co., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1275-76 (I11. 1994) (concluding that
Illinois' state FEPS serves as the exclusive remedy for any "alleged civil rights violation");
Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (holding that Iowa's state FEPS
preempted intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because sexual harassment was the
"outrageous conduct"); Fandrich v. Capital Ford Lincoln Mercury, 901 P.2d 112, 116 (Mont. 1995)
(finding that Montana's state FEPS preempted assault claim against co-worker). A few scholars
have argued that tort law should serve as the exclusive remedy for sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability
Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv. 375, 376 (1998). But see MACKINNON, supra note 102, at
88; Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1462-63 (1986) (arguing for the creation of a new sexual
harassment tort claim).
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seduction. 124 This claim escaped the consent hazard because the seduced
young woman did not sue on her own behalf. Instead, a father sued for
his lost honor, now besmirched by his daughter's damaged reputation,
and for his financial losses, tethered to her earning capacity now reduced
by pregnancy and motherhood. 125 Consent was irrelevant to the
seduction claim. 1
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Professor Lea VanderVelde has suggested that two assumptions
precluded women from recovering for themselves. She wrote:*
First, women lacked the protection against sexual interference
afforded by self ownership. Second, the law tacitly assumed that
if a woman became involved in a sexual connection she must
have consented to the act and all its subsequent consequences.
The act of involvement in the event, even as a victim, spoke for
the woman, denying her ability to recover against the man.1
27
Do these assumptions still apply to working adolescents? As to the first
point, one could argue that current laws do not afford minors self-
ownership. For example, the law gives parents the right to wages earned
by their children. 128 As discussed earlier, children do not enjoy many of
the contractual and civil rights enjoyed by adults.' 29 They must
emancipate themselves to enjoy full legal status. 130
124. Phipps, supra note 72, at 14 & n.63; VanderVelde, supra note 121, at 818-19; cf Bostic v.
Smyrna Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261, 2003 WL 723262, at *7 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003) (rejecting loss of
filial consortium claim based upon an 1828 Kentucky seduction action that allowed a family to
recover for the "dishonor and disgrace" of a seduced child).
125. VanderVelde, supra note 121, at 819. Originally, the writ of seduction, a feudal writ,
allowed masters (employers) to recover for the lost work of their servants (employees). Thus, when
a female servant became pregnant, the master could seek reimbursement for his financial losses.
This system ignored the servant's losses and the needs of her newborn. The law extended these
rights to fathers with daughters working outside of the fathers' households. Id. at 821.
126. Id. at 825.
127. Id. at 828-29.
128. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500 (West 1994); Singer v. Brookman, 578 N.E.2d 1, 6 (I1.
App. Ct. 1991) (finding that "in the absence of specific fiduciary relationship, a parent has the right
to the use of a minor child's earnings and services"); Biermann v. Biermann, 584 S.W.2d 106, 108
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a parent having custody may give the minor child license to work
and retain the earnings of that child); Peot v. Ferraro, 266 N.W.2d 586, 731 (Wis. 1978) (ruling that
a "parent is entitled to a minor child's wages and services as a matter of right").
129. See supra Part i.A.
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 1011 (defining minor as "a person who has
not reached full legal age" and an emancipated minor as a "minor who is self-supporting and
independent of parental control, [usually] as a result of a court order"). See generally MARTIN R.
GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 31-32 (1997) (examining the concept of
emancipation).
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As to the second point, current law, embodied in the "rule of
sevens,"'' 31 explicitly posits the capacity in most teenagers to consent.
Under this traditional rule, a minor under age seven cannot give consent,
be held liable for negligent conduct, or formulate the requisite mental
state to engage in criminal conduct. From seven to fourteen, the law
presumes that a minor lacks capacity. From fourteen to twenty-one (now
eighteen), a rebuttable presumption declares that minors are competent
to consent and responsible for criminal and negligent conduct. 132 Thus,
in the context of a civil claim for damages and absent evidence to the
contrary, this bright-line rule allows a trier-of-fact to presume that a
child over fourteen consents to sexual contact. 1
33
Another archaic rule that may relate to modem treatment of sexual
harassment victims is the misprision doctrine. Under this rule, a plaintiff
risked criminal prosecution if she attempted to sue civilly for her
physical injuries before first pressing criminal charges against her rapist
or seducer. 134 Thus, the failure to file criminal charges effectively barred
a civil suit. Criminal sanctions failed to compensate the victims for the
damage to their reputations, medical expenses, and the expense of any
child conceived. By funneling the redress for a rape or seduction into the
public forum, the government minimized the damage to the victim,
maximized the societal harm, and retained its exclusive control over
vengeance and retribution. 3 5 This result has a parallel in modem
jurisprudence, as embodied in the new affirmative defense to Title VII
claims.
2. An Affirmative Defense to Modern Sexual Harassment Claims
Compare the misprision doctrine to one of Title VII's new affirmative
defenses to sexual harassment charges. In Faragher v. City of Boca
131. In the criminal system, this rule is also known as the infancy defense. See generally
GARDNER, supra note 130, at 1880-81 (discussing the infancy defense and capacity to commit a
crime); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 351 (1972).
132. See Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL
327906, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
133. Another bright line rule similar to the rule of sevens is the "mature minors" doctrine. The
Mama Taori's court recognized that some mature minors may consent to conduct reserved for
adults. Id. at *5; see infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text. See generally GARDNER, supra
note 130, at 6 (discussing the "mature minor" and consent to medical treatment).
134. See VanderVelde, supra note 121, at 847.
135. See id. at 846-48.
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Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 3 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that a victim's unreasonable failure to avail herself of an
employer's preventive or corrective procedures insulates the employer
from liability for sexual harassment that does not result in a tangible
employment detriment. 137 Thus, if the employer adopts a complaint
procedure that a victim "unreasonably" fails to follow, the Faragher and
Ellerth decisions effectively bar her from pursuing a sexual harassment
claim. 138
The rationale behind the new affirmative defense centers on
motivating employers to adopt preventative and corrective procedures.
1 39
The Court's Faragher and Ellerth decisions encourage victims to
complain and employers to cure hostile work environments. A complaint
procedure and corrective action, however, cannot remedy the damage
already done by a harasser. Moreover, by completely insulating the
employer from liability for past harassment, the Court has ultimately
charged the cost of this incentive system to the injured victim.' 40 With
this defense, the government (the judiciary) minimizes the harm to the
victim, maximizes the harm (discrimination) to society, and gives
exclusive control over vengeance and retribution to the employer.
When consent is not an issue and state FEPS do not preempt common
law claims, modern plaintiffs can bring a wide variety of tort claims.
Such claims include but are not limited to assault, battery, false
imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of
136. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
137. The Ellerth Court held:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence .... The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Id. at 765 (citations omitted); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 807-08
(1998).
138. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
139. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; see infra notes 182-83 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Ashton v. Okosun, 266 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a minor,
whose manager touched her on her buttocks and attempted to hug her, had unreasonably failed to
avail herself of all complaint procedures when she complained the day after she left work and
refused to return after an investigating manager declared her allegations unfounded but offered to
transfer her to another shift to avoid the accused).
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emotional distress, and loss of consortium or companionship. Other
claims focus on the employer's failure to satisfy a particular duty. Those
claims include negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent
retention. The minor's consent operates to weaken, if not extinguish, all
of these claims unless some statutory treatment of consent negates the
default. 141
3. Consent as a Limiting Factor in Tort Claims
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892C offers hope, however, for
"consenting" adolescent workers. Subsection (2) states, "If conduct is
made criminal in order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective
of their consent, the consent of the members of that class to the conduct
is not effective t*o bar a tort action."'142 This guidance suggests that in
those states with a high "age of consent" for statutory rape (eighteen),
adolescent "consent" should not operate to bar tort recovery. 143 The
Restatement functions as a guide, but lacks the power of binding
precedent.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A provides meager support
for those adolescents in states with lower ages of consent (below
eighteen). Subsection (2)(a) specifies that in order to extinguish liability,
consent must be "by one who has the capacity to consent.' 44 The
comment to this subsection provides:
If, however, the one who consents is not capable of appreciating
the nature, extent or probable consequences of the conduct, the
consent is not effective to bar liability unless the parent,
guardian, or other person empowered to consent for the
incompetent has given consent, in which case the consent of the
authorized person will be effective even though the incompetent
'45does not consent ....
141. One might argue that consent should not extinguish the negligent hiring and supervision
claims. However, if the claim that the employer was negligent relates back, for example, to a sexual
battery to which the plaintiff consented, then no underlying tort exists and the negligent supervision
claim loses its strength.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C(2) (1979).
143. See Wilson v. Tobiassen, 777 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a minor's
incapacity to consent to sexual acts under Oregon Revised Statute § 163.315(1) extends to civil
cases).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a).
145. Id. § 892A cmt. b.
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This exception appears tailored for the mentally challenged, disabled, or
immature. According to this caveat, an adolescent's consent should not
be legally binding if the minor could not understand the nature, extent,
or probable consequences of the proposed activity. Arguably, a minor,
who has never had sex, might not appreciate the consequences of such a
choice. Even a non-virginal minor may not appreciate the potential
ramifications of sex with a co-worker or supervisor. Scientific
information regarding adolescent psychosocial and brain development
suggests that adolescents may not have the neurological function and
psychosocial ability to formulate legally binding consent.1
46
Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B addresses some of
the special facts in Sara's case. Subsection (2) states:
If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to
consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature of the
invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected
from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by
the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the
unexpected invasion or harm. 1
47
This provision describes how fraud and misrepresentations can
invalidate consent induced by such falsehoods. One might argue that the
manager's profession of love for Sara, his lies about the brain tumor, and
his failure to disclose his status as a registered sex offender constituted
multiple misrepresentations that vitiated her consent. 148 Because she
never would have consented to have sex with him had she known the
truth, and withdrew her consent once she understood the truth, the fraud
paves the way for a sexual harassment suit. Whether a court would
follow this non-binding legal guidance remains unclear. 149
146. A detailed discussion of adolescent physical and psychosocial development is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a complete discussion of adolescent development as it pertains to sexual
harassment law, see Drobac, supra note 3. I thank Professor Lois Weithorn who kindly referred me
to the MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study that prompted my research of
adolescent psychosocial development and its application to sexual harassment law.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2).
148. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 119
(5th ed. 1984); see also Hackett v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1369-70 (2002);
In re Neal, 179 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995).
149. See Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a naval officer's
fraudulent concealment of venereal disease invalidated consent of partner to sexual intercourse). But
cf Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1999) (giving legal
effect to consent to an entry and allowing consent as a defense to a claim of trespass, even though it
was obtained by misrepresentation or concealed intentions).
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D. Conclusions Concerning Criminal and Civil Law
This review of criminal and civil law reveals several truths. First, the
law handles adolescent "consent" to sexual conduct inconsistently. The
system (criminal or civil), the geographic region (or jurisdiction), and
the particular claims alleged all influence the legal treatment of
adolescent "consent." A teenager in California can expect very different
treatment than a teenager in Colorado, where the "age of consent" is
three years lower.1 50 Second, common law claims may provide little or
no relief to "consenting" teens. Preemption may bar tort claims in
employment cases, 51 or courts may conclude that a minor appreciated
the consequences of her consent to specific conduct. On the other hand,
depending upon where the minor works, state criminal law may pave the
way for tort recovery via Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892C(2).'52
Third, antidiscrimination laws always require that the minor worker find
the activity "unwelcome," and often require the alleged victim to report
misconduct. 53 Fourth, statutory rape laws draw bright-line rules
determining the "age of consent" and denying capacity below that age. 1
54
In sum, no national consensus exists regarding the age of consent or the
treatment of adolescent "consent" to a broad variety of adult activities,
including sex.
III. PUBLIC POLICY
The question persists why criminal and civil law handle the exact
same "consensual" behavior very differently. One response focuses on
juridical objectives and public policy motivations. While the goals of the
criminal and civil systems overlap in some aspects, they remain distinct
in others. The differences in motivating justifications for criminal and
civil laws may explain the differing treatment of adolescent "consent."
A. Criminal Statutory Rape Law
Criminal law prevents harm to society, as well as individuals within
society. Our designation of the "State" or the "People" to prosecute
150. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part II.C.3.
153. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Part II.A.
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perpetrators serves as a constant reminder of that broad utilitarian
goal.155 Another goal of the criminal justice system centers on
punishment of the perpetrator who commits the bad act, or actus reus.
Punishment serves several subsidiary aims: deterrence (both general and
specific), rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation.1 56 With a strict
liability offense such as statutory rape, society demonstrates its concern
not with the actor's guilty mind, or mens rea, but with the harm to our
children.
What harm results from "consensual" teen-adult sexual contact? How
is this illegal conduct between the adolescent and the adult so different
from the same, legal behavior between consenting adults? The question,
properly framed, analyzes not so much the sexual conduct but the quality
of the consent. The physical acts between teenagers and adults may be
the same as those between two adults. What differs between adolescents
and adults are the expectations, motivations, and experiential wisdom (or
lack thereof) that produce the problematic "consent." '157 Additionally,
because adolescent expectations and motivations differ, and because the
nature of the consent differs, the consequences of the exact same
behavior also differ for adolescents. 1
58
After studying statutory rape cases, Professor Michelle Oberman
suggested that "there is at least one important difference between girls
and women when it comes to consensual sex: the sexual bargains struck
by girls often are so painfully one-sided that it is difficult for adults to
understand what prompted the girl to consent."'159 Professor Oberman
categorized a national Westlaw database of statutory rape cases into four
groups: consensual relationships, acquaintance rape, stranger rape, and
155. See Phipps, supra note 72, at 27; see, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 26500 (West 1988) ("The
public prosecutor shall attend the courts, and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct
on behalf of the people all prosecutions for public offenses.").
156. See Phipps, supra note 72, at 28-29.
157. See Drobac, supra note 3, at 14-16.
158. Harms in addition to juvenile sexual violation justify the statutory rape laws. Phipps
explained that in addition to protecting children, statutory rape laws historically protected "the
Weaker Sex" and facilitated the prevention of unwanted pregnancy. Phipps, supra note 72, at 34-
40; see Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1981). The Michael M Court
reviewed other possible justifications for the law in validating pregnancy prevention: "Some
legislators may have been concerned about preventing teenage pregnancies, others about protecting
young females from physical injury or from the loss of 'chastity,' and still others about promoting
various religious and moral attitudes towards premarital sex." 450 U.S. at 470. Phipps noted that in
1996, the increasing birth of children to teenagers on public assistance renewed legislative interest
in statutory rape laws. Phipps, supra note 72, at 4-5.
159. Oberman, supra note 83, at 714.
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overreaching and/or age range of more than ten years. Eighty-one
percent of the national group and ninety-one percent of the Illinois cases
fell into the overreaching category. 60  Oberman concluded that
prosecutors targeted the cases with a greater age gap between the parties
because of the greater "risk of significant power disparity between the
parties.' 61 Her findings suggest that the public is concerned about
coercion and power disparities in sexual relationships involving minors.
The notion that juvenile capacity, and therefore "consent," differs
qualitatively from adult consent engenders passionate debate. 62 This
idea, however, dates back hundreds if not thousands of years. 163 Because
we have historically deemed children incapable of giving informed
consent, the law pertaining to children differs from that concerning
adults in everything from contract formation to fundamental civil
rights.' 64
If we accept that children cannot give informed consent because they
lack capacity, the sexual taking of a child's body constitutes a theft of
the most intimate kind-a rape. This violation, or actus reus, justifies the
punishment. 65 As the child approaches the age of consent and maturity,
however, society becomes less certain of the disability. We see this
uncertainty in the statutes that set lower ages of consent for sexual
contact than for sexual penetration.
Children's rights advocates, who take a self-determinist approach,
maintain that children should enjoy the right to make decisions for
160. Id. at 748.
161. Id. at 751.
162. Compare Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood'for Adolescents' Autonomy and Privacy as
Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 99-102 (1983) with Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating
Adolescent Decisionmaking in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221, 224-31, 240 (1995).
163. Phipps, supra note 72, at 33-34 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 212 (William S. Hein ed., 1992) (1769)).
164. See supra Part L.A (highlighting some of these differences in the review of adolescent rights
and legal limitations).
165. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Justice Thomas stated:
For instance, there is no scienter requirement for statutory rape. See, e.g., Tenn. St. § 39-13-
506; Or. St. § 163.365; Mo. St. § 566.032; Ga. St. § 16-6-3. That is, a person can be arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted for having sex with a minor, without the government ever producing
any evidence, let alone proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that a minor did not consent. In
fact, "[f]or purposes of the child molesting statute.., consent is irrelevant. The legislature has
determined in such cases that children under the age of sixteen (16) cannot, as a matter of law,
consent to have sexual acts performed upon them, or consent to engage in a sexual act with
someone over the age of sixteen (16)." Warrick v. State, 538 N.E.2d 952, 954 (Ind. 1989)
(citing Ind. Code 35-42-4-3). The legislature finds the behavior so reprehensible that the intent
is satisfied by the mere act committed by a perpetrator.
Id. at 397 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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themselves whenever practicable.' 66 Some argue that statutory rape laws
disregard adolescent capabilities and sexual autonomy. In her recent
book Harmful to Minors: The Perils of Protecting Children from Sex,
Judith Levine argues that adult fears concerning juvenile sexuality
combined with the "politics of child protectionism" dominate our
governance of children's sexuality. 167 She advocates for "not only
protection and schooling in safety but also the entitlement to
pleasure."' 168 She explains:
There is no distinct moment at which a person is ready to take
on adult responsibilities, nor is it self-evident that only those
who have reached the age of majority are mature enough to be
granted adult privileges ....
Legally designating a class of people categorically unable to
consent to sexual relations is not the best way to protect
children, particularly when "children" include everyone from
birth to eighteen. Criminal law, which must draw unambiguous
lines, is not the proper 6place to adjudicate family conflicts over
youngsters' sexuality.'
6
Levine raises a valid criticism. Her critique of American treatment of
child sexuality deserves attention.
In her analysis of the statutory rape laws, Levine recommends the
review of Dutch legislation passed in 1990. In Holland, the parliament
lowered the age of consent to twelve, but permits adolescents to invoke a
consent age of sixteen if those teens conclude that their partners coerced
or exploited them. The primary power to decide rests with the
166. See generally Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363
(1982); Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343
(1972). Virginia Coigney, who advocated for A Child's Bill of Rights, listed "The Right to Self
Determination" as the first right. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 15, at 1028 (quoting VIRGINIA
COIGNEY, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE Too: How WE FAIL OUR CHILDREN AND How WE CAN LOVE
THEM 197 (1975)). She wrote:
Children should have the right to decide the matters which affect them most directly. This is
the basic right upon which all others depend. Children are now treated as the private property
of their parents on the assumption that it is the parents' fight and responsibility to control the
life of the child. The achievement of children's rights, however, would reduce the need for this
control and bring about an end to the double standard of morals and behavior for adults and
children.
Id. See generally RICHARD E. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974).
167. JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX
xxxv (2002).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 88.
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adolescent. Parents can preempt their children only if those parents
persuade the Council for the Protection of Children that the parents
better represent the child's best interests. 1
70
Professor Michelle Oberman also offered a revised version of current
statutory rape laws to account for adolescent autonomy while ensuring
the protection of children.171 Oberman opined:
[O]ne of the most powerful reasons for enforcing statutory rape
laws is to set normative parameters around sex so that both boys
and girls will learn to honor their own and others' sexual
autonomy ....
Thus, to the extent that the law ignores the learning curve at
work in adolescent sexual encounters, it may be too harsh. But
the failure to condemn "mistakes" involving nonvoluntary sex
with an underage partner is equally pernicious. Lenience in such
cases only encourages girls to internalize a sexual script that
fuses dominance and exploitation with sexual gratification. As
such, it vitiates the promise and obligation of statutory rape
laws: to make the world safe for boys and girls who are coming
of age. 1
72
Rather than lowering the age of consent, Oberman recommended setting
the minimum age for consent at no lower than sixteen and asking victims
to direct whether the court should suspend the sentence of a first time
offender. 173  All parties would understand that if the perpetrator
170. Id. at 89. Some observers might argue that a child who is too young to have sex is too young
to decide whether to invoke the higher age of consent. I thank Professor Florence Roisman for her
poignant comment that Holland leaves a critical decision to those youth who, by their own
admission, may lack capacity.
171. See Oberman, supra note 83, at 778.
172. Id. at 777.
173. Id. at 778. This scheme avoids the flaw raised in supra note 170: that we burden the child
with the decision of whether to prosecute. Under Oberman's plan, the prosecutor retains
prosecutorial discretion. The victim simply makes a plea for a suspended sentence. Oberman also
allowed for exceptions to the rule for conduct that appeared obviously coercive or "offensive to
societal mores." Id. at 779. But see Phipps, supra note 75, at 419-21 (rejecting many of Oberman's
conclusions and her final proposal and offering alternate reforms). In his 2003 article, Phipps
challenged many of Oberman's conclusions regarding the prevalence of statutory rape and statutory
rape laws generally. However, Phipps emphasized Obereman's conclusions pertaining to cases
involving only adolescents-not adults. See id. at 411. Moreover, Phipps mischaracterized
Oberman's proposal to have victims cooperate with the prosecutions of statutory rape. Id. at 415.
Oberman stated, "It strikes me that mandating victim cooperation would be problematic for several
reasons" and then discussed those reasons. Oberman, supra note 83, at 779-82. Finally, it appears
that Phipps misunderstood Oberman's plan for reform, suggesting that minor "victims" would direct
criminal prosecutions. Phipps, supra note 75, at 420-21. Oberman's scheme contemplates a role for
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completed a specified course of action, such as mandatory counseling
and/or a sex education class, the court could dismiss the charges. 74 If
the victim declined to offer an opinion, the prosecutor, not the parents,
could make the decision of whether to request a suspended sentence. 175
Finally, Oberman suggested a set of statutorily defined exceptions that
would indicate "per se violations."' 176 Statutory law would direct cases
with facts suggesting coercion or behavior normatively reprehensible to
full prosecution rather than suspended sentence. 77 In the list of
exceptions, Oberman included cases involving incest, abuse of authority,
repeat offenders, and multiple offenders.' 7
8
Oberman's envisioned changes to U.S. statutory rape law
acknowledge several public policy goals. First, they recognize society's
determination that underage sex hurts children and that the law should
punish and deter it. Second, her plan provides for full prosecution when
the perpetrator uses a position of authority or manipulates a clear power
disparity to coerce sexual conduct. Third, her proposals reflect an
awareness of the developing autonomy and capacity of teenagers to
make decisions regarding sexual activity. They attempt to balance a
protectionist, nurturance approach with the self-determinist philosophy
that would afford adolescents more autonomy as their developing
capacity permitted. 179 Under Oberman's plan, the sexual conduct
remains illegal, but older adolescents with sufficient life experience may
declare themselves ready for the activity and request the suspended
sentence.
B. Civil Antidiscrimination Law
Like criminal law, antidiscrimination law addresses harms to
individuals, as well as to society. Professor Catharine MacKinnon
described the social harm of sexual harassment: "Sexual harassment
exemplifies and promotes employment practices which disadvantage
the minor but ultimately, as noted above, leaves discretion to the prosecutor. Oberman, supra note
83, at 778-79.
174. Oberman, supra note 83, at 778.
175. Id. at 778-79.
176. Id. at 779.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. For a more in-depth analysis of a mixed approach to adolescent rights, see generally
FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).
Washington Law Review
women in work (especially occupational segregation) and sexual
practices which intimately degrade and objectify women. 18°
MacKinnon focused on the subordination of women. Professor Deborah
Rhode described the harms more concretely:
For individual victims, harassment often results in economic and
psychological injuries, including job dismissals, transfers,
coworker hostility, anxiety, depression, and other stress-related
conditions. For women as a group, harassment perpetuates sexist
stereotypes and discourages gender integration of male-
dominated workplaces. For employers and society as a whole,
the price includes decreased productivity and increased job
turnover. The estimated cost of harassment for a Fortune 500
company averages $8 million a year.' 8'
In this passage, Rhode untangled the consequential threads of sexual
harassment for the individual target, for women, and for society.
Antidiscrimination laws respond to each level of injury. "For
example, Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms."'
182
"Although Title VII seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered
on account of unlawful employment discrimination,' . . . its 'primary
objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is
not to provide redress but to avoid harm."' 83 The U.S. Supreme Court
noted that Title VII compensates individuals for their damages but
emphasized Title VII's prevention goal and deterrent effect.
If Title VII serves primarily to prevent abusive sex-based conduct,
then legal tolerance of the consent defense as applied to adolescents
interferes with Title VII's deterrence effect.' 84 In order to avoid Title
VII's purview, sexual predators will manipulate their vulnerable
adolescent targets to "consent." Without an incentive to prevent
"consensual" adolescent sexual exploitation, employers will not create
effective policies or warn adolescent workers about coercive or subtly
manipulative managers. Obviously, this concern over prevention
premises the undesirability of all adolescent workplace sexual conduct,
180. MACKINNON, supra note 102, at 7.
181. RHODE, supra note 113, at 101.
182. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
183. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)) (citations omitted).
184. Similarly, the admission of consent evidence in an evaluation of fault and damages interferes
with Title VIl's deterrent effect by redistributing responsibility for the conduct.
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including "consensual" behavior. Because almost seventy percent of
adults think fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds should not engage in sexual
relations,185  and because seven states define the age of consent
unequivocally at eighteen,' 86  this presumption concerning the
undesirability of "consensual" adolescent sexual conduct in the
workplace seems reasonable.
C. Tort Law
Professor Kenneth Abraham described five functions served by the
imposition of civil liability for accidental and intentional injuries. 187
First, many people expect civil tort liability to compensate individuals
for their injuries. 188 Abraham reasoned that compensation alone is not
really a goal of the tort system, or anyone injured could obtain
compensation. 89 Instead, Abraham focused on tortious conduct and
other goals, including deterrence. 90 Like antidiscrimination laws, tort
liability serves to deter bad acts and prevent future harm.' 91 Abraham
also mentioned a third function, loss distribution.' 92 Rather than make
the plaintiff bear the burden of any loss, tort law provides for a broader
distribution.' 93 The tort system contemplates that insurers will pay
damages incurred by policy holders and that those prospective
defendants who can increase the costs of their goods and services to pay
future judgments will do SO. 19 4
Fourth, Abraham suggested that corrective justice warrants civil
liability in that it restores the moral balance between parties. 195 For
185. See supra note 34.
186. The number of states increases to twenty-seven if a case includes special facts, such as a
significant age difference between the parties or an adult in a position of trust or authority. See App.
A, infra pp. 546-73.
187. ABRAHAM, supra note 120, at 14-19.
188. See id. at 17.
189. Id. at 17-18.
190. Id. at 15. Abraham ultimately decided that tort law "does not serve any single goal ... [but]
performs a 'mixed' set of functions." Id. at 19.
191. Abraham modified this goal by calling it "optimal deterrence." Id. at 19. He explained that,
under this justification, liability should deter only excessively risky conduct. Some conduct is not
risky enough to justify the deterrence costs that people might incur. See id. at 15.
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 16.
194. Jd. at 16-17.
195. Id. at 14-15.
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example, when one person intentionally injures another, basic fairness
justifies the imposition of liability for damages on the bad actor.
Corrective justice seems less appropriate when someone other than the
actor, such as a corporate employer, must pay the damage award. 196 In
that situation, the disconnect between the intentional harm and the
remedial compensation lessens the moral justification. The loss
distribution function better justifies the imposition of tort liability in
such a case-especially when the tortfeasor lacks deep pockets to pay
for the damage caused.' 97
Finally, Abraham reviewed the redress of social grievances through
the tort system. Again, much like the function of antidiscrimination law,
tort law arguably "is a populist mechanism that permits ordinary people
to put authority on trial."' 198 This conception of tort law envisions the
amelioration of problems that affect society more broadly.
Taken together, the goals of the tort system harmonize nicely with the
desire to protect adolescent workers. Arguably, we want to deter sexual
behavior that could harm these workers. By making employers liable for
the acts of their agents, we distribute the losses associated with injuries
to teens who cannot easily cover those losses. Additionally, tort liability
supports corrective justice by restoring the moral balance between
employers and their agents, and adolescent workers who may not have
the experience or wisdom to recognize manipulative sexual advances. As
"a populist mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority on
trial," 199 tort law allows adolescents to challenge supervisors, managers,
and employers. When tort law affords adolescent "consent" legal
significance, it fails those young workers and thwarts the goals of the
system.
D. Conclusions
This review of the law and public policy demonstrates that statutory
rape law, antidiscrimination law, and tort law share many similar
functions and public policy goals. Each attempts to deter and prevent
antisocial, harmful behavior. The sexual exploitation of minors
conceivably falls into the set of antisocial behaviors under criminal, tort,
and antidiscrimination law. Each system holds actors who cause harm
196. Id. at 15.
197. Id. at 16-17.
198. Id. at 19.
199. Id.
Vol. 79:471, 2004
Adolescent Sex & the Workplace
responsible, by punishing them with incarceration or by awarding
damages against them. Each system operates to protect potential victims
from harm through the deterrence and prevention mechanisms. The only
function that the criminal system does not share with civil law is the
redistribution of the costs of harm suffered. Typically, criminal laws do
not compensate the victims for their losses. Both antidiscrimination and
tort laws provide for such compensation, with damage awards against
either the tortfeasor or another responsible party, such as an employer or
insurer.
The obvious next question is whether the civil compensation function
explains why the criminal and civil systems treat adolescent "consent"
so differently. The answer is not immediately apparent. If minors lack
capacity to consent in the criminal arena, why might civil courts
consider such consent in the redistribution of the costs of injury-
especially at the minor's expense? Courts that resolve civil adolescent
sexual harassment cases must deal with the contradictions and conflicts
between civil and criminal laws. Not surprisingly, they deal with
adolescent "consent" in inconsistent ways.
IV. CASE LAW
Even with five million adolescents in the United States workforce, no
Title VII case decisions discuss adolescent "consent., 200 Common sense
dictates that some of these adolescent workers "consented" to sexual
contact.20' Sara's situation proves that such cases exist. Where are the
Title VII decisions then? Do these cases all settle before trial? 202 Are
they decided without opinions and never appealed? The unwelcomeness
requirement may deter many youth, but surely not all.
Several factors may explain the dearth of Title VII cases. First,
practical considerations may prevent prosecution of these cases.
Concerned that adolescent "consent" may constitute a complete defense
200. Of course, any suit would have to be brought by the parents or guardian because minors lack
the capacity to sue in federal and state courts. How ironic that United States' antidiscrimination
laws attribute to minors the ability to consent to sexual relations but not the capacity to seek judicial
relief in court for their own injuries.
201. An informal poll by Teen People magazine reported forty-seven percent of teenage girls said
they had been touched against their will at work. Glenn Burkins, A Special News Report About Life
on the Job-And Trends Taking Shape There, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1999, at Al. I find it incredible
that they all protested or otherwise indicated that they found this contact unwelcome.
202. These cases may settle quickly because the media impact of a public sexual harassment trial
involving a minor victim might engender much more expense and ill will than a quick settlement.
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and disqualify minors from suit, lawyers may decline to take these cases
on a contingent fee basis. Minors and their parents may lack the
financial resources to pay an attorney an hourly fee. Second, as the
AACAP Policy Statement suggested, adolescents may think that they
somehow caused the problem or "attracted" the inappropriate
attention.20 3 Humiliated and ashamed, they may decide not to report the
abusive behavior.20 4 Third, many adolescents may not even realize that
they have been sexually harassed or that they can bring a claim for
damages.20 5 A child that does not appreciate the nature of the conduct or
its consequences may not appreciate its illegal nature. Empirical research
can answer whether these cases abound and why adolescents refrain
from filing suit. These listed reasons are just a few of the plausible
explanations for the nullity of Title VII cases on the issue of consent.
A review of tort and statutory adolescent sexual harassment "consent"
cases from across the nation reveals that they fall into four different
groupings with several that fit into two or more categories. 0 6 The largest
203. See Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 65; see also Doe v. Estes, 926
F. Supp. 979, 988 (D. Nev. 1996). The Estes court explained:
Children are often reluctant to report invasions of their bodily integrity. They may fear
reprisals by their attackers, they may harbor doubts that their attackers' fellow grownups will
display sympathy or willingly credit their accounts, and they all too frequently are paralyzed by
the shame that attends subjection to sexual abuse.
926 F. Supp. at 988.
204. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 449 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that "Doe
explained that she had kept the matter [sexual conduct with a teacher] a secret because she feared
the repercussions of disclosure"); Leach v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., No. EV98-0196 C-
Y/H, 2000 WL 33309376, at *2-*3 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2000) (finding that a student failed to report
sexual harassment because she felt ashamed, was afraid to tell her mother for fear of upsetting her,
and was afraid that no one would believe her that a teacher was sexually fondling her).
205. See supra note 56. Minors may also miss the applicable statute of limitations for filing their
claims. See, e.g., Ashton v. Okosun, 266 F. Supp. 2d 399, 404 (D. Md. 2003) (refusing to toll the
300-day statute of limitations for a minor to bring suit under Title VII).
206. A few of the Westlaw search phrases I used in the "allcases" directory include the following:
("title vii" "title ix" "feps" "human rights" "civil rights") & (minor child adolescent teenage!)
w/5 sexual! w/2 harass!; (adolescent! minor! child!) w/5 consen! w/20 (seduc! sex!
intercourse) & ("1983" "title ix" fep! negligen! "title vii" "human rights" "civil rights") &
"sexual harassment"; (adolescent! minor! child!) w/5 consen! w/5 (seduc! sex! intercourse) &
("1983" "title ix" fep! negligen! "title vii" "human rights" "civil rights") % ti(state people
commonwealth); (adolescent! minor! child!) w/10 consent w/10 (seduc! sex! intercourse) &
"sexual harassment" & ("1983" "title ix" fep! negligen! "title vii" "human rights" "civil
rights") % ti(state people commonwealth).
I do not consider cases decided before 1945 because of the very different prevailing sexual norms
and changes in law in the succeeding years. See, e.g., Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 285
(N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (holding that consent negates civil claim for damages resulting from a rape);
Braun v. Heidrich, 241 N.W. 599, 601 (N.D. 1932) (finding that minor guilty of fornication may not
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category (seventeen cases) deals not with sexual harassment per se, but
with state and common law civil claims based upon alleged
inappropriate sexual conduct with a minor.2 °7 The next largest group
(four cases) involves sexual harassment but not in employment. It
comprises those cases brought under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972208 because the harassment happened at school or
the perpetrator was a teacher or staff member.20 9 In several cases (three),
plaintiffs used § 1983210 when the perpetrator was a public school
recover civil damages); Parsons v. Parker, 170 S.E. 1, 3 (Va. 1933) (confirming that consent will
not bar civil recovery for seduction but is admissible concerning damages).
207. Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 444-45 (7th Cir. 2000) (resolving common law
claims against a non-profit corporation); Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL
723262, at *4-8 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003) (disposing of Title IX and state common law claims);
Hackett v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1346, 1356-60 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(resolving Title IX, § 1983 and Georgia common law claims); Teti v. Huron Ins. Co., 914 F. Supp.
1132, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (resolving a claim for defense and indemnity and addressing the issue of
a student's consent to sex with a teacher); Angie M. v. Hiemstra, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 202-03 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (ruling on a seduction claim and other state statutory and common law tort claims
against a physician); Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding
a violation of California Civil Code § 1714.1, a parental responsibility statute); Bohrer v. DeHart,
943 P.2d 1220, 1231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (deciding tort claims against a minister and church by a
minor parishioner); McNamee v. A.J.W., 519 S.E.2d 298, 301 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (resolving
negligence claims brought against parents and their minor child for a sexual encounter with the
minor plaintiff); Robinson v. Roberts, 423 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving a
negligence claim against a school principal and a teacher); Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701,
709-10 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (addressing various state statutory claims concerning a sexual
relationship between a student and teacher); LK v. Reed, 631 So. 2d 604, 608-09 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (affirming a decision on negligence and other tort claims against the school board and another
student); Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 699 A.2d 550, 560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (resolving the issue
of insurance coverage and addressing the issue of consent); Wilson v. Tobiassen, 777 P.2d 1379,
1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (deciding tort claims against a boy scout troop and leader); Doe by Roe v.
Orangeburg County Sch., 518 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (S.C. 1999) (reviewing a negligent supervision
claim against the school district); Doe by Doe v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 448 S.E.2d 564, 567-68
(S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (deciding a seduction claim and other tort claims for a hospital volunteer),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 464 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 1995); Robinson v. Moore, 408
S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (resolving a seduction claim); Michelle T. by Sumpter v.
Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Wis. 1993) (affirming a civil battery resolution).
208. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
209. Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1997)
(deciding both Title IX and § 1983 claims), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998); Bostic, 2003 WL
723262, at * 4-8 (disposing of Title IX and state common law claims); Hackett, 238 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1346, 1356-60 (resolving Title IX, § 1983, and Georgia common law claims); Benefield v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1218 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (deciding only a Title
IX claim).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Some courts have rejected § 1983 claims brought with Title IX
claims, reasoning that the "Sea Clammers Doctrine," see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), prevents overlapping claims and that Title IX
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employee.211 Under § 1983, a student sued for a violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process liberty interest right to
bodily integrity.212 1 found only one state FEPS employment case for an
incident that occurred at a restaurant.21 3
A. FEPS: Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza
In Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, 214 a sixteen-year-old male
and his parents brought suit under the Tennessee FEPS for sexual
harassment against a male adult co-worker and the restaurant owner.
2 5
Doe claimed he engaged in sexual acts in the restaurant bathroom with
thirty-two-year-old Christopher Abson, who had given him "a
'marijuana cigarette [that] contained a "knock out drug" that caused
[him] ... to become incapacitated.' ' 2 16 The parents alleged that Abson
had two prior rape convictions, one for raping a child.21 7 Abson pled
guilty to two counts of the statutory rape of Doe.218 Via an interlocutory
appeal in the civil case, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court's refusal
to strike the restaurant owner's affirmative defenses based on the
minor's consent and comparative fault.219
1. Consent-A Civil Defense?
Doe and his parents first argued that consent should not constitute a
defense to a civil action for damages when it fails as a defense to a
preempts any § 1983 claim. See, e.g., Leach, 2000 WL 33309376, at * 11-* 12. But see DiSalvio v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 00-5463, 2002 WL 734343, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2002)
(holding that the Sea Clammers Doctrine does not preempt a Title IX claim).
211. Mary M., 131 F.3d at 1220; Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 449-50 (5th Cir.
1994) (resolving only a § 1983 claim); Hackett, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
212. Taylor, 15 F.3d at451.
213. Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
214. No. M 1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
215. Doe and his parents made claims under the state FEPS, the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as
well as intentional tort and negligence claims. Id. at *2. Same-sex harassment based on sex violates
Title VII. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). Most states have
similarly interpreted their antidiscrimination FEPS.
216. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *2.
217. Id. at *1.
218. Id. at *2. Mr. Abson also pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Id.
219. See id.
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criminal statutory rape charge. 220 The court disagreed, classifying the
sexual behavior as a battery.221 Referring to well-established principles
of common law, the court held that a plaintiff who consents cannot later
complain of the behavior.222 The court acknowledged that consent lacks
defensive significance "if (1) the person giving consent lacked the
necessary capacity, (2) the consent was coerced, (3) the person giving
the consent was mistaken about the nature and quality of the act, or (4)
the nature of the act was such that no person could consent to it."' 22 3 The
court also explained that "[i]ncapacity to give consent may arise from
age, intoxication or mental incompetence., 224 However, the court
declined to rule, as a matter of law, that Doe lacked capacity simply
because he was under eighteen. Doe's capacity and the quality of his
consent remained triable issues of fact.225
In discussing the capacity of minors to consent, the court relied upon
a medical consent case, Cardwell v. Bechtol.226 Quoting Cardwell, the
court found "that maturity is now reached at earlier stages of growth
than at the time the common law recognized the age of majority at 21
years., 227 The court listed the Cardwell factors that determine a mature
minor's capacity: "age, ability, experience, education, training, degree of
maturity or judgment, [and] ... the minor's conduct and demeanor at the
time of the incident. 228 The Mama Taori's court avoided a detailed
evaluation of the nuanced indicia of maturity and training, however. The
Mama Taori's court endorsed the "rule of sevens," used in Cardwell, as
guidance for determining whether a minor has the capacity to give
consent.229 Thus, the Mama Taori's court found Doe presumptively
capable of giving consent, and thereby presumptively insulated his co-
worker (and the restaurant owner) from liability. 230
220. Id. at *4. The age of consent in Tennessee is eighteen when the perpetrator is at least four
years older than the target who is at least thirteen. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2003).
221. See Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *4.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 892A(2), 892B).
224. Id. (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 746 (Tenn. 1987)).
225. See id. at *8.
226. 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
227. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *5 (quoting Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 744-45). But see
Drobac, supra note 3, at 9-10, 16, 25-26.
228. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *5 (citing Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748) (internal
quotations omitted).
229. Id.; see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
230. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *8.
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The Mama Taori's court bolstered its conclusion that minors develop
the capacity to consent before age eighteen by reviewing the post-
Cardwell "mature minors" doctrine and the Tennessee law that affords
minors legal decision-making capacity in a variety of contexts. First, the
court discussed consent to medical treatment, specifically abortion, birth
control information and supplies, and treatment for drug abuse.231 With
respect to a minor's capacity to consent to abortion, the court ignored the
fact that a minor must typically have a parent's permission or be
adjudged competent by a court to make that decision before obtaining an
abortion. 32 Surely, in referencing abortion, the Mama Taori's court was
not suggesting that a minor should seek judicial by-pass for a capacity
determination prior to consenting to sexual relations at the workplace.
With respect to contraception and drug abuse treatment, the Mama
Taori's court failed to address the public policy rationale for those
provisions. Laws do permit minors to obtain contraceptives and seek
treatment for drug abuse and sexually transmitted diseases, but not
because society considers those minors competent to make medical
decisions without parental involvement.233 To the contrary, we know that
many of those minors need medical treatment because they made
immature and uninformed decisions to have unprotected sex, thus
demonstrating their lack of competence to make well-reasoned decisions
regarding sexuality.234 Rather, as a matter of public policy, we have
determined that medical assistance is so important, and the potential
231. Id. at "5.
232. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (2001).
233. See Scott, supra note 32, at 568 & n.80. Scott explained:
No one argues that minors should be deemed adults because they are particularly mature in
making decisions in these treatment contexts. Rather, the focus is on the harm of requiring
parental consent. The targeted treatments all involve situations in which the traditional
assumption-that parents can be counted on to respond to their children's medical needs in a
way that promotes the child's interest-simply might not hold. For example, some parents may
become angry upon learning of their child's drug use or sexual activity. Moreover, even if most
parents would act to promote their children's welfare, adolescents may be reluctant to get help
if they are required to inform their parents about their condition, either because they fear their
parents' reactions or because they do not want to disclose private information. Removing this
obstacle encourages adolescents to seek treatment that may be critically important to their
health. Of course, society also has an interest in reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted
diseases, substance abuse, mental illness, and teenage pregnancy. Together, these social
benefits largely explain why lawmakers shift the boundary of childhood for the purpose of
encouraging treatment of these conditions.
Id. at 568 (footnote omitted).
234. See Angela Huebner, Va. Coop. Extension, Adolescent Growth & Development, FAMILY
AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT PUBLICATION 350-850, at 2 (2000), at
http://www.ext.vt.edu/pubs/family/350-850/350-850.pdf (explaining the "personal fable," a belief
that causes teens to take unnecessary risks such as having unprotected sex).
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negative consequences of no treatment are so devastating, that we will
facilitate the medical treatment of minors, despite their immaturity.235
The Mama Taori's court also noted that Tennessee law criminalizes
sex with teenagers over thirteen only if their partners are more than four
236years their senior. Tennessee's failure to criminalize sex between two
fourteen-year-olds does not necessarily mean that the Tennessee
legislature has judged these minors emotionally, psychologically, and
physically mature, however. The permissive stance concerning young
teens, associated with the required age differential for prosecution,
results more likely from the targeted obviation of predation by mature
adults, than a judgment that young teens are ready to appreciate fully the
ramifications of their sexual behavior. When neither teen has the
capacity to consent to sex, why prosecute one (or both)?237 Laws
pertaining to underage sex may not deter those youth who lack the
capacity to appreciate the ramifications of their sexual behavior. When
the threat of death, from AIDS or other sexually transmitted disease,
fails as a deterrent, we cannot expect that statutory rape laws will inhibit
teen sexual exploration.
In addition, age difference requirements in statutory rape laws say
little about the ability of adolescents to consent at the workplace. Even if
the Mama Taori's court properly used this age differential element to
demonstrate that a sixteen-year-old has the capacity to consent to sex
with peers away from the workplace, one cannot conclude from that
determination that the same youth possesses the capacity to consent to
sex with a thirty-two-year-old co-worker. The logic simply fails. If
anything, the age difference requirement and its associated concern for
power disparities are even more relevant at the workplace. At work, a
manager or an adult with more work experience enjoys a position of
235. See Oberman, supra note 70, at 47; Scott, supra note 32, at 568.
236. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *6.
237. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 1270, 1282 (D. Utah 1995). In an insurance
coverage case, the Patterson court explained:
If the age of the victim is relevant, then arguably the age of the perpetrator should also be
relevant. The reason a child lacks the capacity to consent to sexual activity is because the child
cannot fully appreciate the consequences of such activity. But if a child cannot fully appreciate
the consequences of sexual activity, that is reason not to hold the child perpetrator to the same
standard as an adult .... [C]riminal statutes that make it a crime to engage in sexual acts with
a minor regardless of the minor's consent are based on the premise that minors lack the
experience necessary to give meaningful consent, yet "courts cannot seek to protect nayve
fourteen-year-old[s]... on the one hand, while inferring the most degrading and unnatural
[intentions] on the other hand."
Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jack S., 709 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D. Nev. 1989)).
Washington Law Review
greater status, power, or seniority, and can more easily seduce an
inexperienced minor.
The Mama Taori's court equated the capacity of adolescents to
consent to teen-adult sex with their ability to engage in a broad variety
of activities: lease safety deposit boxes, work part-time, obtain a driver's
license, execute a durable power of attorney for healthcare, and consent
to sex with a peer.23 8 The court drew completely inapposite analogies.
Bright-line age demarcations account crudely for the fact that adolescent
capacity varies by individual and, more particularly, by specific
situation. To suggest that an adolescent worker has the capacity to
consent to oral sex at the workplace with an adult co-worker because
Tennessee law allows him to lease a safety deposit box would be
laughable if the results of such a conclusion were not so potentially
devastating. The court repeatedly failed to recognize the more plausible
motivating reasons for permitting minors certain liberties normally
reserved for adults. For example, we allow minors to surrender their
children for adoption,239 not because we think that those minors are
sufficiently competent to make the adoption decision, but because we
consider them incompetent to raise children.
The Mama Taori's court found that the "mature minors" rule as well
as the "rule of sevens" governed this case and presumptively determined
that Doe's consent carried legal weight.240 In sum, the court placed the
burden of proof on Doe, requiring him to overcome the presumption of
capacity. The court's further discussion of the "totality of the
circumstances" and the Cardwell factors was irrelevant since the court
never engaged in a detailed analysis of Doe's maturity. 24 1 Later in this
Article, I address the advisability of engaging in such analysis. 4 2 Suffice
it to say here, with a reference back to the Texas Hernandez case, 243 that
a serious concern arises. Any sexual harassment case could devolve into
a trial of the minor's maturity (and morality), rather than of the
perpetrator's culpability and the principal's liability. Do we really want
our children on trial as they seek remedy for sexual abuses?
238. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *6,
239. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-110(a) (1996)).
240. Id.
241. The court postponed this more detailed analysis for subsequent proceedings. Id. at * 11.
242. See infra Part V.A.
243. See supra Part II.A.1.
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2. Consent's Admissibility
The Mama Taori's court also rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on
criminal law to prevent the jury from even considering Doe's consent.
The court suggested that barring consideration of consent "would permit
any victim of statutory rape to recover civil damages notwithstanding the
circumstances." 2" The court listed three reasons for its rejection of
plaintiffs' argument: the courts that have declined to adopt this per se
liability rule have recognized (1) that the statutory rape laws do not
explicitly create a private right of action for damages; 245 (2) that criminal
and civil proceedings have different purposes; 246 and (3) that it is
fundamentally unfair to permit a civil litigant to obtain money damages
while preventing the trier-of-fact from considering relevant evidence
regarding damages and credibility.
2 47
In this analysis, the court found first that statutory rape laws create no
private civil claim. However, they do enforce a public consensus that
adolescents lack the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse and, at
certain ages, to sexual contact of any kind. Statutory rape laws also
reflect society's determination that underage sex hurts children. 248 The
Mama Taori's court deflected attention from the relevance of the
consent defense by focusing on the availability of civil damages in a
private civil claim. The court did not explain how the availability of
damages transforms the nature of capacity to consent. More particularly,
the court neglected to explain why the lack of a private claim in the
criminal statute precludes, in a civil claim, treatment of adolescent
"consent" consistent with the criminal law's approach.
Second, the court noted the different purposes of criminal and civil
law with regard to the admissibility of consent. However, our recent
review of the public policy goals suggests that criminal and civil law
functions are more similar than they are different.249 Statutory rape laws
have a three-fold purpose: to protect children (individuals subordinated
because of their immaturity) from sexual predators, to punish
244. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *7.
245. Id. (citing Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2000); McNamee v.
A.J.W., 519 S.E.2d 298, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)).
246. Id. (citing Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
247. Id. (citing LK v. Reed, 631 So. 2d 604, 607 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg
County Sch., 518 S.E.2d 259, 261 (S.C. 1999)).
248. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part 11.
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perpetrators, and to deter predators. ° Civil rights claims such as Title
VII and FEPS serve similar purposes: to protect those workers
(subordinated because of their weaker status) who experience
discrimination (often in the form of sexual predation) and to punish and
deter those employers who permit employees (or agents) to prey upon
subordinated individuals.251 The primary difference relates to the
availability of damages, intended to make the person whole in the civil
case. The civil system compensates victims for their injuries and
influences employers with the threat of a financial penalty.
Thus, the different purposes of the civil and criminal systems, and the
second reason for the court's treatment of Doe's consent, boils down to
the availability of damages to compensate the victim in the civil system.
The Mama Taori's court had referred to this difference, the right to
damages, as the first reason for a rejection of a per se liability rule. The
second of the court's reasons collapses into the first and still makes no
sense. The court again failed to explain why the lack of a private claim
for damages in the criminal statute precludes, in a civil claim, treatment
of adolescent "consent" consistent with the criminal law's approach.
The third reason reveals the court's motivating concerns: credibility
and damages. This reason centers on the alleged unfairness of permitting
the recovery of money damages absent a hearing of all relevant
evidence, including consent, which may provide guidance on the
evaluation of credibility and the calculation of damages. It also
highlights several problems with the court's treatment of adolescent
"consent." If a sixteen-year-old lacks the capacity to consent to teen-
adult sex in Tennessee under criminal law, how does this same consent
miraculously shed light on either credibility or damages under civil law?
If the minor lacks the capacity to consent, then credibility is not relevant
as long as the sex occurred. The sex constitutes an offense no matter
what the adolescent said at the time of the incident or says later in court.
It qualifies as an offense because society (the legislature) has determined
that teen-adult sex is offensive and injurious.
Is society misguided? Is teen-adult sex inoffensive? The reality of the
Mama Taori's case is that Abson did not really "hurt" society by having
sex with Doe. This case was not a criminal prosecution, so it lacked the
underlying criminal public policy concern for "society." Abson may
250. See supra Part III.A.
251. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998); see supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
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have outraged those adults who learned of the behavior, but "society"
did not change. The reality is that Doe suffered the brunt of whatever
injury Abson caused. Moreover, society (via the prosecutor) did not sue
for its own damages. Nor did society sue on behalf of Doe. His parents
did. Here rest the problems.
The credibility determination for the Mama Taori's court concerns
not whether the sex occurred, but the severity, and even existence, of
consequential damages. The Mama Taori's court wanted to ensure that
the jurors had the opportunity to evaluate Doe's credibility regarding his
personal offense and damages. Society's determination that teen-adult
sex is criminally offensive in Tennessee was irrelevant to the Mama
Taori's civil court. Society's determination evaporated, and the court
started from a clean civil slate, demanding that Doe prove his personal
offense and damages. This civil court equated consent with immunity
from damage (volenti non fit injuria) and did not equate societal harm
with individual harm. The judge and jurors may have felt outraged about
the homosexual "rape," but their offense was not Doe's, and the judge
wanted the jurors to evaluate Doe's personal offense and damages.
Doe's consent fostered the judge's skepticism about Doe's damages
and outrage. Why? Because jurors might find that Doe was morally
culpable, an accomplice in an illicit act. The court even noted in the
recitation of the facts that, prior to the alleged sexual encounter, when
Mama Taori's transferred Abson to another restaurant, Doe sought a
transfer to the same location. When Mama Taori's denied Doe the
transfer, he threatened to quit and reapply at the other location.252
These facts are irrelevant to the issue of capacity for several reasons.
That Doe may have admired or even adored Abson does not prove that
Doe had the cognitive and psychosocial ability to formulate legally
significant consent to sex. Second, Tennessee statutory rape law that sets
the age of consent at eighteen indicates the legislature's determination
that someone Doe's age does not have capacity. 53 Third, reliance on
these facts risks the importation of a defense similar to the chastity and
promiscuity defenses. Recall Hernandez.54 In Hernandez, the court
ruled that consent to sex elevates a minor's capacity to one of legal
significance.2 55 As noted previously, the choice to engage in sex is not a
252. Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at *1.
253. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2003).
254. Hernandez v. State, 861 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1993); see supra Part II.A.I.
255. Hernandez, 861 S.W.2d at 910 n.1.
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scientific indicator of maturity and capacity. Neither is the choice to
follow a worker to another employment site. These facts paint Doe as a
willing accomplice and foreshadow the court's true concerns-moral
culpability and legal responsibility. Ultimately, the court conflated the
two and found Doe (potentially) legally responsible because he was
(possibly) morally culpable.
3. Developmental Capacity Applied to Mama Taori's
I distinguish between legal responsibility and moral culpability or
blameworthiness. If I accidentally break a glass, I am responsible but not
morally culpable because I did not smash the glass purposefully. With
the rule of sevens and the infancy defense, we shield young children
from legal responsibility for their criminal and negligent behavior
because we adjudge them incapable of understanding or avoiding
criminal and tortious conduct. We believe them innocent, morally
blameless.
256
Consider this distinction step by step as it relates to Mama Taori's.
Begin with the notion that no capacity equates with no fault. Graduate to
the concept that teenagers have some capacity. I find the term
"diminished capacity" 257 inappropriate because the word "diminished"
carries a negative connotation. Additionally, it suggests that full capacity
should exist or may once have existed. Most teenagers suffer not from
impairment but from immaturity-a blameless condition and a natural
phase of growth. I prefer the term "developing capacity" because of a
teenager's transitional status from childhood to adulthood and his or her
256. See generally Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 503, 510-11 (1984); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender:
Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 267, 272
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
257. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 801, 829-34
(2003). In discussing adolescent criminal offenders, Professors Scott and Steinberg explained:
The differences that distinguish adolescents from adults are more subtle-mitigating, but not
exculpatory. Most obviously, cognitive and psycho-social immaturity undermines youthful
decisionmaking in ways that reduce culpability. Moreover, due to their immaturity, adolescents
may be more vulnerable to coercive pressures than are adults. Finally because their criminal
acts are influenced by normal developmental processes, typical adolescent law breakers are
different from fully responsible adults whose crimes are assumed to be the product of bad
moral character. Thus, young offenders are less culpable than adults because of their
diminished capacity; but they are also appropriately identified with actors who succumb to
coercive pressures or who demonstrate that their criminal acts were out of character, and who
are less culpable because their responses are those of ordinary persons.
Id. at 829-30.
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218developing maturity.2 8 What level of fault should we associate with
developing capacity? "No fault" hardly seems fair since the teenager has
some capacity. Logically, one could equate the quantum of fault with the
level of maturing capacity. Thus, we see how a comparative fault
scheme would appear attractive to a court attempting to associate fault
with capacity. Here, however, is the flaw in the logic.
Full legal capacity means just that-complete capacity. Not
diminished capacity. Not developing capacity. Full legal capacity is an
all-or-nothing proposition. There is no sliding scale for legal capacity.
Our discussion in Part I confirmed that adolescents have not reached that
legal threshold. Even in the criminal system, we try adolescents in
juvenile court as children or in adult court as adults. We do not try them
in adult court as mature children. When one considers such a sliding
scale seriously, one sees the fallacy of such an idea. How can we justify
holding someone morally culpable and then fully legally responsible,
when that person is incapable of manifesting full reasoning and decision-
making abilities because of transitioning developmental maturity?
I realize that this stance necessarily leaves intact an inconsistency
between the criminal and civil systems. Because of the need to protect
society from crimes committed by adolescents, I endorse Professors
Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg's proposal that the juvenile
justice system recognize adolescent "diminished responsibility" due to
diminished culpability. 259 However, I reassert that adolescents-even
adolescent criminal offenders-lack full adult legal capacity. Moreover,
I do not suggest a "diminished culpability" or "diminished
responsibility" parallel for the civil system because my focus is the
protection of youth, and their developing capacity, from sexual
exploitation by adults. I would still shield adolescents from legal
responsibility for their immature choices because adult exploitation
causes their injury. The need to protect society (and individual victims)
from crimes committed by adolescents, however, justifies the different
treatment in the criminal system of adolescent "developing capacity"
and the different level of legal responsibility (and culpability) attributed
to adolescent criminal offenders.
258. 1 thank Martin Drobac for clarifying this point.
259. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice For Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents'
Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 403, 405 (1999); Scott & Steinberg, supra
note 257, at 835-36; see also Scott, supra note 32, at 589-96; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of
Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 389, 399, 405-06 (1999).
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Consider another example using a younger child and compare it to the
Mama Taori's case. A stranger in a car offers candy to a six-year-old on
the street. If the child consents to enter the car, do we hold the child
legally responsible for his damages that result? No. First, the child lacks
the experience and knowledge to comprehend that he should not follow
the stranger for the candy. The child lacks capacity-the ability to make
a well-reasoned decision in the given circumstances. Second, the
damage results not from the child's choice, nor from his entering the car.
The damage results when the adult molests or abducts that child.
One might argue that a sixteen-year-old should know better than to
enter a car with a stranger; but should the teenager know better than to
follow a caring workplace mentor to another pizzeria? We, as a society,
traditionally give children (including adolescents) the benefit of the
development doubt until they reach the age of eighteen. They are
innocent until adjudged mature. Tennessee law considers Doe incapable
of consenting to sex. Why would this same law credit him capable of
foretelling his own abuse before it occurs? Second, just as with the
younger child, Doe's damages resulted neither from his requested (and
denied) transfer to another location, nor from his consent. They resulted
from Abson's abuse and exploitation of Doe's immaturity.
Given this discussion of capacity and the distinction between
culpability and responsibility, the most likely explanation for the Mama
Taori's holding is that the judge did not credit Doe's lack of capacity.
One without capacity remains faultless, morally innocent and legally
shielded. From the perspective of a strict moralist (and perhaps most of
society), Doe's consent destroyed his credibility and negated his
subjective offense. 260 Because Doe was morally culpable, the judge was
willing to let a jury find him legally responsible.
260. See, e.g., Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (finding that
in 1933 a fifteen-year-old girl could not sue the common carrier for tort damages resulting from a
rape when she consented to sex). The Barton court held that the New York statutory rape law served
"to protect the virtue of females and to save society from the ills of promiscuous intercourse." 1d.
Note that the court did not equate the injury to the women with the injury done to society. With
respect to the woman's injury, the Barton court explained:
It is one thing to say that society will protect itself by punishing those who consort with
females under the age of consent; it is another to hold that, knowing the nature of her act, such
female shall be rewarded for her indiscretion. Surely public policy-to serve which the statute
was adopted-will not be vindicated by recompensing her for willing participation in that
against which the law sought to protect her. The very object of the statute will be frustrated if
by a material return for her fall "we should unwarily put it in the power of the female sex to
become seducers in their turn." Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232. Instead of incapacity to
consent being a shield to save, it might be a sword to desecrate. The court is of the opinion that
a female under the age of eighteen has no cause of action against a male with whom she
willingly consorts, if she knows the nature and quality of her act.
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4. Comparative Fault in Mama Taori's
The Mama Taori's court revealed its fault-based, moralistic
perspective as it dealt with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892C. The
court explained:
As we construe this provision, it eliminates consent as a
complete defense to a civil action for damages. It does not,
however, prevent the trier-of-fact from considering evidence of
consent when it is allocating fault or determining the existence
and extent of the plaintiff's damages.
Deterrence and punishment for illegal acts should be left to
the criminal law. The public's interests are sufficiently protected
by the imposition of criminal sanctions. Thus, civil actions for
damages should be left to proceed under ordinary tort law
principles.26 1
The court completely sidestepped the provisions of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 892C. If this subsection eliminates consent as a
complete defense, because the legislature intended to protect minors
from underage sex, how did the court justify removing that shield with
respect to damages? The court ignored the shared purposes of both
criminal and civil laws. It ignored that criminal law generally protects
potential individual victims as well as society. Additionally, the court
ignored the deterrent and punitive effects of tort law.
Rather than accept Tennessee's judgment regarding teen capacity, the
court reverted to "ordinary tort law principles" and redirected the
litigation into a comparative fault paradigm. The court reasoned:
"[c]onsistent with the doctrine of comparative fault, one of these
principles is that a mature minor's conduct, like an adult's conduct, is
relevant with regard to fault and damages.,
262
A moralistic perspective also explains the court's suggestion that
Doe's consent could negate consequential damages. Consent does not
disprove damage. It merely releases the tortfeasor from liability, civil
legal responsibility. If Abson had offered to punch Doe, and Doe had
Id. This passage makes clear that lawmakers wanted to protect society and female "virtue," not
individual women. The court does stress, however, that the woman must know the nature and
quality of her act before her consent bars recovery.
261. Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
262. Id. Mama Taori's had responded with a comparative fault defense, directed at the parents as
non-parties. The court affirmed the lower court's decision not to strike that defense as to the parents.
Id. at *8-*9.
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consented, his consent would not have erased the resulting bloody nose.
It would have simply insulated Abson from liability for the broken nose
and resulting medical bills. The damage would still exist.
If the Mama Taori's court had been truly worried about the extent or
even existence of damage, it could have directed the litigation in other
ways. Defense counsel could have impeached Doe's testimony regarding
his damages by pointing to a lack of corroborating medical or other
physical evidence. Defense counsel could have introduced evidence of
Doe's ability to function in other contexts during that same time period.
Evidence of persistently good academic evaluations, excellence on an
athletic team, and the ability to maintain other friendships might all
speak to his good adjustment and the lack of negative impact by the
alleged sexual encounter.
If consent has relevance, one might argue that Doe's consent
exacerbated his trauma. The knowledge that he "consented" to
homosexual activity and a sexual predator who duped him might
enhance his sense of shame and humiliation. However, the introduction
of that evidence will inevitably raise prejudices regarding sexuality and
morality: good children do not engage in sex. We return again to
Hernandez morality: children who have sex do not deserve protection or
compensation for their injuries.263
5. Conclusions for Mama Taori's
The ultimate issue addressed in the interlocutory appeal opinion by
the Mama Taori's court was whether the defense could use Doe's
consent as a legal defense to the FEPS and tort claims. Instead of
protecting Doe, the Mama Taori's court arranged for the trial of Doe.
With the harassment trial, he risked what rape victims often
263. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg argued for formal recognition of developmental
characteristics to avoid racist and other discriminatory results in criminal adjudications. Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 257, at 837. They reasoned:
A developmentally-informed boundary constraining decisionmakers represents a collective
pre-commitment to recognizing the mitigating character of youth in assigning blame.
Otherwise, immaturity often may be ignored when the exigencies of a particular case engender
a punitive response .... This concern is critical, given the evidence that illegitimate racial and
ethnic biases influence attitudes about the punishment of young offenders and that
decisionmakers appear to discount the mitigating impact of immaturity in minority youths.
Id. One can see the parallel concern for how sexist attitudes might cause the discounting of
immaturity in a sexual harassment case. Decisionmakers might blame the victim without
understanding the nature of the target's developing capacity.
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experience-a trial of his character and the accusation, "He asked for
it!"
Susan Estrich, who argued against the unwelcomeness requirement in
sexual harassment Title VII cases, commented upon the relevance of
adult consent (or failure to resist adequately):
The [rape] consent standard-and the corresponding inquiries
into what a woman did or said, how she "led the man on," or
how she failed adequately to signal her nonconsent-have at
least until recently, made successful prosecution of acquaintance
rape all but impossible. Where the relationship is "appropriate,"
at least to the court's eyes, judges tend to see sex, not rape.
Similarly, in Title VII cases they see sex, not sexual harassment.
In both types of cases, they are often wrong. That a certain
relationship might be appropriate does not necessarily mean that
the man's behavior has been.
The strongest justification for the welcomeness doctrine is
that the rule ensures that consensual workplace sex does not
provide the basis for a civil action. The more radical response to
this argument is that there is no such thing as truly "welcome"
sex between a male boss and a female employee who needs her
job. And if there is, then the women who welcome it will not be
bringing lawsuits in any event. 2 4
Estrich's comments prove even more poignant with respect to
"consenting" teens. One could argue (and the Tennessee legislature,
among others, has decided) that there is no such thing as truly welcome
sex between adults and minors below the age of consent. Employment
only worsens the calculus. If a mature (but subordinated) woman who
needs her job has difficulty refusing a man, think of the trouble an
immature teen will experience in trying to refuse the same man.
Estrich concluded that the unwelcomeness requirement serves, in part,
to discourage women from filing suit. She noted the empirical studies
concerning the prevalence of workplace sexual harassment and pointed
to the dearth of lawsuits.265 We began this section on FEPS by noting
that only one case documents a complaint by a "consenting" teen.
266
Where are the other teens who surely were manipulated? Or those who,
unknowingly, said "Yes"?
264. Estrich, supra note 96, at 831.
265. Id. at 833.
266. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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The Mama Taori's court's justifications for considering Doe's
consent cannot withstand scrutiny. What the court referred to as the
"mature minor" rule is in many cases a misnomer. The "rule of sevens"
pretends to mark accurately the development of adolescent maturity.
Actually, it is an archaic bright-line rule designed to avoid the onerous
and inexact task of evaluating the maturity of a minor at a given point in
time that has long since passed.267 The court sidestepped the
Restatement's guidance in § 892C and ignored underlying public policy
reasons that justify both criminal and civil law. 268 To add insult to injury,
the court charged Doe and his parents with the costs of the appeal.2 69
The Mama Taori's decision could have a chilling effect on future
sexual harassment cases. It also demonstrates that a court, struggling
with a new issue, might presume Sara capable of consenting and,
thereby, prevent a successful sexual harassment suit under Title VII,
state FEPS, or relevant tort law.
B. Tort Cases
Of the seventeen tort cases, sixteen split evenly on whether they held
consent relevant to the tort claims.27 ° One found that fraud invalidated a
minor's consent, but the court's reasoning suggests that it might have
267. Scott and Steinberg noted how prejudices threaten any maturity evaluation. They
emphasized:
[W]e currently lack the diagnostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an
individualized basis or to distinguish young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as
adults, will repudiate their reckless experimentation. Litigating maturity on a case-by-case
basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other
than immaturity.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 257, at 836-37.
268. See supra Part I1.
269. Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906,
at *1 I (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001).
270. Eight cases found consent relevant. Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000);
Teti v. Huron Ins. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr.
94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); McNamee v. A.J.W., 519 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Robinson v.
Roberts, 423 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); LK v. Reed, 631 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Doe
by Roe v. Orangeburg County Sch., 518 S.E.2d 259, 261 (S.C. 1999); and Michelle T. by Sumpter
v. Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327 (Wis. 1993). Eight cases found consent irrelevant. Bostic v. Smyrna
Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL 723262 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003); Angie M. v. Hiemstra, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996);
Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 699 A.2d 550
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Wilson v. Tobiassen, 777 P.2d 1379 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Doe by Doe v.
Greenville Hosp. Sys., 448 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 464 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 1995); and Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App.
1966).
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credited the consent had the fraud not occurred.271 Several of the cases
that ruled consent relevant served as guiding precedent in Mama Taori's
and used now familiar reasoning. Those cases that determined consent
irrelevant employed reasoning consistent with each other, most adopting
the home state's criminal law assessment of adolescent "consent."
1. Consent as Irrelevant
In Doe by Doe v. Greenville Hospital System,272 the court ruled that a
candy striper, under sixteen-years-old and working in a hospital,273 could
not legally consent to sexual intercourse with a thirty-one-year-old
hospital employee. The hospital argued, as had the defense in Mama
Taori's, that a criminal statute had no relevance to a battery claim. The
hospital further asserted that battery required a nonconsensual touching.
The court disagreed, finding that § 16-3-655(3) of the South Carolina
Code,274 which invalidated consent as a defense to a sexual battery
against a minor, applied in both criminal and civil contexts. The court
held:
As a matter of public policy, the General Assembly has
determined a minor under the age of sixteen is not capable of
voluntarily consenting to a sexual battery committed by an older
271. See Hackett v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(finding that the lies the science teacher told his male student induced the student's consent to
inappropriate sexual touching). The court held, "[C]onsent to the act by the person affected negates
the contact as an actionable tort. 'As a general rule, there can be no tort committed against a person
consenting thereto, if that consent is free and not obtained by fraud, and is the action of a sound
mind."' Id. (quoting Mines v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902,906 (1964)).
272. 448 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). The lower court returned a verdict for Mary in the sum
of $545,000. The trial judge reduced the award to $250,000 under the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act. Id. at 565. The jury rejected a claim by Mary's father "for loss of custody, companionship, and
service." Id. The father's claim appears to be akin to a seduction claim already discussed. See supra
note 125.
273. The Workers' Compensation Act did not preclude Mary Doe's tort claims because she
received only classroom credit and job skills training in exchange for her services. Greenville Hosp.,
448 S.E.2d at 567-68. Thus, the court did not consider her an employee. Id. Non-employee status
also would preclude someone like Mary Doe, engaged in volunteer work, from suing under an
applicable state FEPS. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 114-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding
that volunteer student intern did not qualify as an employee under Title VII), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1114 (1998); Lippold v. Duggal Color Projects, Inc., No. 96 CIV 5869(JSM), 1998 WL 13854, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1998) (confirming that unpaid volunteer cannot sue under Title VII because
she is not an employee).
274. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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person. This is the law of the state whether it is applied in a
criminal or civil context, 75
Additionally, the court found that the criminal law applied to Mary
Doe's negligent hiring and supervision claims against the hospital.276
The question understandably left unanswered by the Greenville
Hospital decision is what the court would have done if Mary Doe had
been sixteen, as Sara was. The Greenville Hospital court consistently
applied the criminal law presumptions in a civil case, but this application
is hardly shocking since the South Carolina Code defined the age of
consent at sixteen. Mary Doe was under sixteen, so the criminal
presumptions still applied in her case. The law might have forced the
dismissal of Mary Doe's claims had she been only a few months
older.2 77 Again, we notice the relevance of the state-defined age of
consent, which may or may not coincide with the age of majority,
typically eighteen.
Other courts similarly found that the age of consent, as defined under
criminal law, establishes a compelling public policy that under-aged
youth lack the ability to consent to sexual conduct.278 In Bostic v. The
Smyrna School District,279 the court noted the public policy concerns and
reasoned:
It would be a bizarre rule indeed that, for purposes of civil
liability, would call a teenager's "consent" sufficient to make a
relationship "welcome" and thus not a basis for civil liability,
when the very same relationship is rape under the exacting
standards for criminal liability. Bostic's sadly misguided
participation in the affair is no shield from liability for the
defendants.28°
275. Greenville Hosp., 448 S.E.2d at 566.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Teti v. Huron Ins. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1132, 1139-40 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that
because the criminal law permits a consent defense when the victim is sixteen, the civil law must
recognize the capacity of minors sixteen and older).
278. Wilson v. Tobiassen, 777 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Or. Ct. App, 1989); see also Angie M. v.
Hiemstra, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging "the strong public policy
that underlies the Legislature's enactment of the multiple statutes directed at protecting minors from
sexual exploitation"). The Angie M court distinguished another sexual battery statute, California
Civil Code § 1708.5, which required a lack of consent. Angie M, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 202-03. Despite
the Angie M. court's focus on public policy regarding minors, that reference suggests that the court
would have denied a claim by Angie M. under § 1708.5.
279. No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL 723262 (D. Del. Feb. 24,2003).
280. Id. at *6 (citing Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1227 (1 1th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)). The Bostic court discussed consent in the context of the
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In this passage, the Bostic court stressed the lack of logic in an
inconsistent treatment of adolescent "consent." In Robinson v. Moore,28'
the court explained:
The [c]ourts in this country have uniformly taken the position
that where the defendant's act constitutes a violation of a statute,
such as a rape statute fixing the age of consent to intercourse,
which has as its primary purpose the protection of a definite
class of persons from their own immaturity of judgment, the
plaintiff's consent is not a defense to a civil action.282
This language tracks the reasoning of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 892C. Two other courts specifically cited or discussed this provision
283
and the other Restatement sections. Several cases did not make
explicit the public policy rationale but held that consent could not
constitute a defense under the circumstances alleged.284
2. Consent as Relevant
Courts that found consent relevant to the discussion of civil liability
based their determinations on several factors. First, as in Mama Taori's,
the courts noted that criminal laws provide no private right of action.285
As explained earlier, this reason does not clarify why courts should not
apply the criminal law presumptions consistently for an existing civil
private right of action. Additionally, the absence of a private right of
action under a criminal statute fails to address the absence of logic of
finding capacity in one system and a lack thereof in another.
Second, courts pointed to the different purposes of the criminal and
civil systems.286 The primary differences relate to the availability of
Title IX claim as well as the other civil claims and, therefore, referred to whether the plaintiff
welcomed the sexual relationship. Id.
281. 408 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
282. Id. at 583. The court was incorrect that other courts in this country have uniformly adopted
this position. See supra Part II.C.3.
283. Pettit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 699 A.2d 550, 557 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (evaluating
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A, cmt. b); Wilson, 777 P.2d at 1384 (discussing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C).
284. Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So.
2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Pettit, 699 A.2d at 557.
285. McNamee v. A.J.W., 519 S.E.2d 298, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). See generally Beul v. ASSE
Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441,450-51 (7th Cir. 2000).
286. Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); McNamee, 519 S.E.2d
at 302.
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damages and the influence of civil liberties afforded older adolescents.
With respect to civil liberties, several courts reasoned that because
minors engage in certain adult conduct, civil law should assign full legal
capacity. In Cynthia M v. Rodney E.,287 the court listed the abortion
right and the right to consent to other types of medical treatment.288 The
Cynthia M court reasoned:
"Capacity exits when the minor has the ability of the average
person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits.
Moreover, decisional and statutory law is replete with examples
of situations in which a child over the age of fourteen is deemed
to have the mental capacity of an adult.,
289
Again, this comment confuses a determination of adolescent capacity
with other public policy reasons for granting minors the right to engage
in these adult activities. As previously noted, just because we permit an
adolescent to obtain an abortion does not necessarily mean that we
attribute to her the ability of the average adult to weigh the risks and
benefits on a regular basis-or even in most circumstances.
The existence and assessment of damages appears to be the major
concern of all of these courts. The damage calculus figures into not only
the second factor concerning the different purposes of the criminal and
civil systems, but also a third factor regarding unfairness. Specifically,
courts that permitted consideration of adolescent "consent" emphasized
the injustice of granting damages to a participant in a crime and of
limiting evidence under those circumstances.
The restriction of evidence concerned the Mama Taori's court and
other tribunals. For example, in Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg County
School District,290 the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed admission
of plaintiffs "willing participation" to the sex but only on the issue of
damages, not the issue of liability. 291 The court specifically distinguished
the lower court's holding in Greenville Hospital, which found that a
child under sixteen did not have the capacity to consent to sex.292 In
Orangeburg, the plaintiff and her parents sued the school district and a
teacher who failed to supervise students, during which time a sexual
287. 279 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
288. Id. at 97.
289. Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 148, § 18, at 115) (citation omitted); see also
McNamee, 519 S.E.2d at 302 (using the same words as the Cynthia M decision).
290. 518 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1999).
291. Id. at 261.
292. Id.
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assault occurred.293 A sixteen-year-old mentally handicapped student
allegedly sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl after the coach left
them alone in the school gym.
294
The Orangeburg court relied on Barnes v. Barnes,295 a challenge to
the Indiana Rape Shield Statute.296 Quoting Barnes, the Orangeburg
court reasoned:
"Unlike the victim in a criminal case, the plaintiff in a civil
damage action is 'on trial' in the sense that he or she is an actual
party seeking affirmative relief from another party. Such
plaintiff is a voluntary participant, with strong financial
incentive to shape the evidence that determines the outcome. It
is antithetical to principles of fair trial that one party may seek
recovery from another based on evidence it selects while
precluding opposing relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice. 97
This passage highlights the court's focus on fairness. The court ignored,
however, that prejudice regularly justifies the exclusion of probative
evidence.298 Additionally, the court missed the point of exclusion. The
main reason for excluding the consent was not the prejudice potentially
created, but the minor's incapacity that rendered the consent legally
invalid. This court did not even hesitate to put the consenting minor "on
trial."
The other concern pertaining to fairness centered on the minor's
"willing participation" in the conduct.2 99 Just as in Mama Taori 's, many
of these cases invoked concepts of comparative fault, contributory
negligence, or assumption of risk to deal with the victim's conduct.300
293. Id. at 259.
294. Id.
295. 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992).
296. Id. at 1342.
297. Orangeburg, 518 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Barnes, 603 N.E.2d at 1342).
298. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (directing that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice").
299. Orangeburg, 518 S.E.2d at 261; see also Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); LK v. Reed, 631 So. 2d 604, 607 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
300. See, e.g., Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2000) (opting for a
comparative fault rule); Robinson v. Roberts, 423 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (evaluating
contributory negligence and assumption of risk to find that a thirteen-year-old can "appreciate
dangers of his environment and.., avoid consequences associated with exposure to such dangers");
LK, 631 So. 2d at 608 (determining that their "analysis must include the principles of comparative
fault").
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Many took a moralistic stance, evaluating whether the victim was
"innocent" or not.30 1 The Cynthia M. court explained: "We have
emphasized the word 'innocent' because we believe there is an
important distinction between a party who is injured through no fault of
his or her own and an injured party who willingly participated in the
offense about which the complaint is made., 30 2 Quoting a 1922
Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the Cynthia M court added, "'[T]o
recognize the asserted right to recover would be to permit plaintiff to
profit by the wrong to which she voluntarily was a party. ... ,,301 Just
like the Mama Taori's court, the Cynthia M court ignored the fact that a
minor lacks the capacity to consent in the criminal context. The court
missed the meaning of the statutory rape charge. The notion that a minor
"profits" when she collects money for medical bills associated with a
pregnancy, for psychotherapy, or for emotional and physical distress
deserves no comment. Cynthia M. stands as another classic example in
which we blame the victim, this time, a sixteen-year-old.
In LK v. Reed,30 4 a thirteen-year-old special education student took the
blame, or at least a pro rata share of it.305 A.K., through her estate
administrators, sued another student and the school board after A.K.
allegedly agreed to engage in sex with an eighteen-year-old special
education high school junior.30 6 The LK court noted:
[T]he anomaly created by the trial court's
holding... necessarily entitles any carnal knowledge victim to
civil damages. Under the trial court's holding, a girl could
301. See, e.g., Cynthia M., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 98; LK, 631 So. 2d at 607; Orangeburg, 518 S.E.2d
at 259-60 (noting that the "District proffered testimony tending to dispute the claim Doe was a
sweet, innocent young girl with testimony that she had been overheard making sexually explicit
statements").
302. Cynthia M, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
303. Id. (quoting Overhultz v. Row, 92 So. 716, 717 (La. 1922)). Having stated that Overhultz
was "directly on point," the Cynthia M court then applied reasoning formulated for an adult. Id. In
its final footnote, the Cynthia M court admitted that the Overhultz plaintiff was not a minor. Id. at
98 n.14. The court then stated, "However, we are not inclined to dwell on outdated legal fictions
concerning the ability of underage females to consent to sex." Id. Commenting upon the current
prevalence of underage sexual activity and the problem of pregnancy among unwed teenagers, the
court added, "To cling to vestiges of a bygone era, is to ignore the contemporary realities of nature."
Id. In this footnote, the Cynthia M. court arguably blamed teenagers for their promiscuity and
particularly teenaged girls for their non-marital pregnancies. The court's treatment of their consent
and effective denial of their damages may not prove to be the best way to handle these social ills.
304. 631 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
305. Id. at 607.
306. Id. at 605.
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provoke a criminal prosecution against a sexual partner and
recover damages from him, both as a result of her willful and
voluntary actions in consenting to, or instigating, a sexual
liaison.30 7
This passage conjures the specter of the young seductress, luring men to
their financial demise. It bears no relation to the reality of a thirteen-
year-old special education student with an IQ of between sixty-four and
seventy-four.30 8 The LK court also neglected to consider that any
potential sexual partner of such a Lolita30 9 remained free to reject her
advances and spare himself criminal and potential civil liability. This
notion of the child harlot, ready to entrap an unsuspecting partner,
exemplifies the most dated, sexist notions of women (and girls) as
avaricious temptresses.
310
307. Id. at 607; see also Orangeburg, 518 S.E.2d at 261 (reasoning that "[t]o prohibit such
evidence [of consent] would effectually allow a victim to come in and tell a one-sided version of
events, without being subject to any real cross-examination or impeachment as to the damages
actually suffered").
308. LK, 631 So. 2d at 605. Despite its ultimate determination, the court recited other disturbing
facts:
[A]t the time of these events A.K. was a 13-year-old girl with minimal intellectual and social
skills. She was shy and obedient and had never had a boyfriend. She had a history of seizures
for which she took daily medication. Her family was poor in financial assets but rich in
religious beliefs. In the year preceding these events, A.K.'s father was involved in an accident
which rendered him a paraplegic, and A.K.'s mother donated a kidney to A.K.'s younger sister,
a surgery requiring extended visits to New Orleans.
A.K.'s family stress coupled with her age, intellect, and social skills, render her consent,
from a legal standpoint, almost meaningless. Accordingly, we assess A.K.'s fault at 5% and
reduce the damages awarded to her by that percentage.
Id. at 608.
309. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (Random House 1989) (1955) (telling the story of a middle-
aged man seduced by his landlady's twelve-year-old daughter).
310. See Marybeth Hamilton Arnold, "The Life of a Citizen in the Hands of a Woman": Sexual
Assault in New York City, 1790-1820, in PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 35, 40-45
(Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989) (discussing sexual assault of women at the turn of
the nineteenth century and highlighting the popular myth of sexually voracious working class
women). Arnold noted the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl who was likened to a harlot. Id at 42.
Counsel for the defense argued:
[If] anything of an improper nature passed between them, I am inclined to believe that it has
been with her consent. The passions may be as warm in a girl of her age as in one of more
advanced years, and with very little enticement she may have consented to become his
mistress .... [It] is said her youth renders it impossible she should have been a lewd girl. Who
is acquainted with the dissolute morals of our city, and does not know that females are to be
found living in a state of open prostitution at the early ages of 12 and 13 years?
Id. (citing Report of the Trial of Richard D. Croucher, on an Indictment for a Rape of Margaret
Miller, on Tuesday, the 8th day of July, 1800, at 15, 18 (New York: 1800)); see also Estelle B.
Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, in
PASSION AND POWER, supra, at 199, 212 (explaining that victims of sexual predators were described
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In McNamee v. A.J. W, 31 the court suggested that the admissibility of
the consent might hinge upon whether the sexual partner was also a
minor.312 This suggestion again reflects an emphasis on comparative
fault. 313 As discussed earlier, if neither party possesses the capacity to
consent, why should we blame (in a comparative fault scheme) either?314
Such a policy makes no logical sense. While comparative fault seems
inappropriate when applied to minors who lack capacity, the concept
hints at a parallel concern--comparative power. The McNamee court
was perhaps correct (but for the wrong reason) to emphasize the
difference between teen-teen and teen-adult consensual sex.
3. From Comparative Fault to Comparative Power
Many of the tort cases that found adolescent "consent" relevant to a
civil claim for damages favored comparative fault schemes. In contrast,
those cases that found consent irrelevant emphasized the power disparity
between teenagers and adult partners. Courts attributed enhanced power
to factors such as older age and maturity, a position of authority, and a
position of confidence or trust.315 For example, in Angie M. v.
Hiemstra,3 16 the minor consented to sex with a forty-eight-year-old
physician with whom she worked. The court found that he "took
advantage of his position of authority and of Angie's confidence in him
to cause her to develop a dependent relationship on him 'in much the
manner of the phenomen[on] of "transference" between a patient and his
or her psychotherapist."317
In Bohrer v. DeHart,318 the court rejected a comparative fault
instruction after a minister allegedly sexually abused a minor
parishioner. The court determined that "dependence, transference and
the resulting vulnerability do not cease merely because a child physically
"as 'seductive,' 'flirtatious,' and sexually precocious"). But see Kathy Peiss, "Charity Girls" and
City Pleasures: Historical Notes on Working Class Sexuality, 1880-1920, in PASSION AND POWER,
supra, at 57, 64 (discussing "charity girls," working women who traded sex for gifts and attention).
31 1. 519 S.E.2d. 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
312. Id. at 302-03.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part IV.A.4.
315. See, e.g., Angie M. v. Hiemstra, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the
partner's age, position of authority, and position of confidence).
316. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
317. Id. at 200.
318. 943 P.2d 1220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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matures while sexual abuse in secrecy by an adult in a position of trust
continues unabated., 319 The Bohrer court determined that consent was
inadmissible as a defense because of a power imbalance caused by the
minor's sexual encounters with a religious counselor.320
Other teen-adult relationships, in addition to those involving doctors
or ministers, resulted in power disparities acknowledged by courts. A
teacher holds a position of authority that permits influence over and
creates a power imbalance with an adolescent. 321 The Bostic court
explained that "Smith's affair with Bostic cannot be viewed as
consensual, given the minority of the student and the relationship of trust
and authority which the coach held over her. 322 Additionally, in
Orangeburg, a case that found consent relevant to the issue of damages,
the court referenced a South Carolina Code criminal provision that
prohibited sexual conduct between a minor and an "actor [who] is in a
position of familial, custodial, or official authority to coerce the victim
to submit or is older than the victim. ' 323 Thus, both tort and criminal law
recognize that a power imbalance creates a greater potential for
influence and abuse of a minor.
C. Title IX and § 1983 Cases
Title IX and § 1983 cases raise some of the same issues as the more
traditional tort claims but borrow heavily from Title VII jurisprudence.
In Benefield v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,324 the
court considered whether a fifteen-year-old college student could sue her
university under Title IX for sexual harassment by classmates.325 The
court distinguished college students from elementary and secondary
319. Id. at 1227.
320. Id. (citing E. Cruz, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual Exploitation and
the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499 (1991)).
321. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999) (quoting Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995), in holding that "the nature of [the State's] power [over
public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that
could not be exercised over free adults").
322. Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL 723262, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 24,
2003).
323. Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg County Sch., 518 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 1999) (reviewing South
Carolina Code § 16-3-655(3)).
324. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
325. Id. at 1215.
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school students.326 It rejected her claim, holding that the university did
not stand in loco parentis.327 The Benefield court ultimately ruled that
"[tlo constitute sexual harassment, the behavior in question must be
unwelcome.,
328
In Mary M v. North Lawrence Community School Corp. ,329 the court
took a different position. The Mary M court reviewed a Title IX claim
by an eighth grader against a twenty-one-year-old cafeteria worker.33°
The district court had permitted an instruction regarding whether the
plaintiff found the conduct unwelcome. 331 The instruction read:
In order to find in favor of the Plaintiff, you must find first that
the alleged sexual advances and/or abuses occurred, and if it did,
that the advances and/or abuses were unwelcome by her.
Conduct is unwelcome if Diane M. did not solicit or incite it,
and if she regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. In
determining whether the conduct was unwelcome, you should
consider such things as Diane M.'s receptiveness to the alleged
sexual advances and/or abuse in light of her words, acts and
demeanor; her emotional predisposition, if any; the age disparity
between her and Andrew Fields; any power disparity between
them due to Diane M.'s status as a student and Andrew Field's
status as a school employee.332
This instruction tracks the unwelcomeness requirement established for
Title VII cases. It also acknowledges the potential power disparity
between an adult school worker and a minor.
The appellate court rejected the instruction and held:
While welcomeness is properly a question of fact in the context
of Title VII employment discrimination cases, we decline to
extend the inquiry to Title IX cases when elementary students
are involved. It goes without saying that sexual harassment in
326. Id. at 1218.
327. Id. at 1220. Black's Law Dictionary defines in loco parentis to mean "[alcting as a
temporary guardian of a child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 791. Ironically,
when defining the noun, Black's Dictionary refers to "[s]upervision of a young adult by an
administrative body such as a university." Id.
328. Benefield, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
329. 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1997).
330. Id. at 1221.
331. Id. at 1223.
332. Id. at 1224.
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the workplace is vastly different from sexual harassment in a
school setting.33
Despite the obvious differences between school and work, the court
listed six reasons why sexual harassment at school deserves a different
analysis. 34 First, the court noted the greater ability of teachers and
school officials to control behavior in the classroom, suggesting that
"students look to their teachers for guidance as well as for protection. 335
Second, the court explained that school harassment leaves a "longer
lasting impact on its younger victims and institutionalizes sexual
harassment as accepted behavior."336 Third, the court reasoned that while
adults can leave a hostile work environment, children can rarely leave
school.337  Fourth, the court emphasized that children need a
nondiscriminatory environment in which to maximize their intellectual
growth. The court stated: "A sexually abusive environment inhibits, if
not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full intellectual
potential and receiving the most from the academic program." 338 Fifth,
the court admonished that schools act in loco parentis while employers
do not.339 Finally, the court concluded that "employees are older and
(presumably) know how to say no to unwelcome advances, while
children may not even understand that they are being harassed.1
3 40
The third and sixth reasons reveal that the Mary M court assumed a
workplace populated by adult workers. If one reviews the court's
reasoning and substitutes adolescent workers for the adults, the court's
analysis weakens, and the two environments (school and work) appear
less distinct. For example, one might argue that sexual harassment at
work leaves a lasting impact on young workers just as it does on young
students. Additionally, as noted previously, many adolescent workers
may not understand they are experiencing sexual harassment.341
333. Id. at 1226 (citation omitted). The court noted that in Indiana, where the harassment
occurred, elementary school extends through the eighth grade. Id. at 1225 n.6. The court added:
"We decline to opine, however, on whether secondary school students can welcome sexual
advances in harassment claims arising under Title IX." Id.
334. See id. at 1226-27.
335. Id. at 1226 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir.
1996)).
336. Id. (citing Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1227.
341. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, the court should have distinguished two different types of
sexual harassment-harassment of children and harassment of adults-
rather than two different environments. 342 In other words, the
unwelcomeness requirement may be appropriate as applied to adults
3 43
but not as applied to minors, whether they are at school or at work.
1. Reliance on Criminal Law
Like many of the tort cases, the Mary M case also raised the
relevance of the criminal law's definition of the age of consent. The
Mary M court concluded:
If elementary school children cannot be said to consent to sex in
a criminal context, they similarly cannot be said to welcome it in
a civil context. To find otherwise would be incongruous.
An opposite holding would defeat the purposes of Title IX
and make children claiming sexual discrimination under Title IX
subject to intense scrutiny .... If welcomeness were properly an
issue for the jury in cases involving elementary students, the
very children bringing the suits would be subject to intense
scrutiny regarding their responses to their alleged abusers. Trial
transcripts would be replete with insinuations that a child
dressed or acted in such a manner as to ask for the very conduct
she or he is seeking to redress .... We decline to allow the
inference that an elementary school student is presumed to have
not consented to molestation by a twenty-one year old in a
criminal case, but welcomed the same conduct in a civil case. 3 "
In this passage, the court acknowledged the inconsistency of a failure to
apply a criminal law presumption in a civil case. More importantly, the
Mary M court understood that once a child's consent comes into
evidence, the child goes on trial. Unlike the Orangeburg court, the Mary
M. court eschewed the notion of putting a child on trial.345 The Mary M
342. But see Benefield v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1218 (N.D. Ala.
2002) (holding that Title IX does not distinguish between types of behavior based on the age of the
student).
343. Many feminists, including Professor Estrich, would dispute that assertion. See supra note
264 and accompanying text.
344. MaryM, 131 F.3d at 1227.
345. Compare id. with Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg County Sch., 518 S.E.2d 259, 261 (S.C. 1999);
see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Ironically, the Orangeburg court took its
guidance from Barnes, an Indiana case. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text. The Mary
M case originated in Indiana. Mary M., 131 F.3d at 1220.
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court "refused to transfer the onus on the child to prove that in fact she
or he did not welcome the complained-of advances."
346
2. An Abuse of Power or Casual Sex?
The Doe v. Taylor Independent School District3 47 case again explored
348the power disparity first acknowledged in the tort cases. It also
supports Professor Estrich's view that how a person characterizes the
appropriateness of a relationship will influence whether he calls sexual
conduct sex or sexual harassment. 349 The Taylor majority held that a
child holds a constitutional right to bodily integrity under the Due
Process Clause35 0 and permitted a § 1983 claim.35' While the majority
did not specifically address Doe's consent, the concurrence and dissents
raised interesting perspectives.
In his concurrence, Justice Higginbotham described the attitudes of
the majority and dissent:
The majority and dissents divide today over the "law," but that
division rests largely on perceptions of the human condition. We
have all looked at the same set of facts and come away with
quite different perceptions of what transpired between teacher
and pupil. The majority sees an exploitation of power and the
dissents see ca[s]ual sex. Make no mistake about it. This case is
not about a high school coach who happened to have an affair
with a student. It is about abuse of power.352
In this passage, the Justice emphasized the teacher's abuse of power over
his student.353
346. MaryM., 131 F.3d at 1227.
347. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
348. See id.
349. See supra note 264 and accompanying text; see also Oberman, supra note 70, at 34-35.
350. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Taylor court explained:
This circuit held as early as 1981 that "the right to be free of state-occasioned damage to a
person's bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process."
If the Constitution protects a schoolchild against being tied to a chair or against arbitrary
paddlings, then surely the Constitution protects a schoolchild from physical sexual abuse-
here, sexually fondling a 15-year old school girl and statutory rape-by a public schoolteacher.
Taylor, 15 F.3d at 450-51 (citations omitted).
351. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 457.
352. Id. at 459 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
353. See also id. at 460 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (interpreting "Coach Stroud's use of his
position of authority to pressure and manipulate Doe into sex" as "arbitrary and capricious").
Washington Law Review
In contrast, the dissenters focused, in part, on Doe's consent. Justice
Garwood suggested that he would permit the § 1983 claim only if the
consenting child was immature.354 He argued:
It is not clearly established that age fifteen is, per se, sufficiently
immature. Plainly Doe was of a sufficient age to bear children.
Perhaps that should not be the test and instead arguably a
minimum age of sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen would make
sense as a bright line for these purposes.355
Justice Garwood's concern regarding the bright-line demarcation raises
an interesting question that another dissenter posed later. Justice Edith
Jones noted that not all criminal statutory rape laws set the age of
consent at fifteen. 356 She explained that in some states the age is
lower.357 She then asked, "[H]as the majority made a constitutional
offense of conduct that in some states is not criminal? ' 358 This question
highlights just one of the problems that results from the American legal
system's failure to implement a consistent policy regarding adolescent
"consent" to sexual conduct.
D. Conclusion for Sara?
Does Sara have a justiciable claim for sexual harassment against the
theater owner? From this review of criminal, sexual harassment, and tort
law, we see that the answer still depends on where she consented and
files suit. The claims she brings will also influence the outcome. She
faces a long and humiliating trial, the outcome of which is not clear, if
she sues in Tennessee under its FEPS. Even a successful statutory rape
prosecution against the perpetrator will not assist her there. She has
almost no chance for success under antidiscrimination or tort law in
those twenty-four states that set the age of consent at sixteen or lower. 359
That number increases to thirty-five if courts in eleven states reject the
354. Id. at 467-68 (Garwood, J., dissenting).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 479 n.8 (Jones, J., dissenting).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. These twenty-four states include: (14) Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina; (16)
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming; and those states with special fact
requirements that do not match Sara's: (14) Maine, (16) Connecticut, Michigan, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Vermont. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73.
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special facts of her case.360 In those states, she will be treated as an adult
and her consent will bar most claims. She also has little chance for
success in Wisconsin where the age of consent is eighteen but where, in
Michelle T by Sumpter v. Crozier,36 1 the court determined that consent
would defeat a civil battery claim by a minor.362
In two states, California and Louisiana, where the ages of consent are
eighteen and seventeen respectively, the law is as murky as it is in
Tennessee. In San Diego, California, the Angie M court found consent
irrelevant.363 However, in Cynthia M, the same San Diego court found it
relevant.364 Sara's chance of success there depends completely upon the
types of claims she pleads. In Louisiana, the LK court found consent
relevant, and the same Third Circuit court found it irrelevant two years
later in Landreneau.365 1 cannot predict what might happen there for Sara
today. Neither can I predict with certainty what will happen in the
remaining eleven states.366
V. A SYNTHESIS FOR A FUTURE APPROACH
If some advantage explained the inconsistency in the treatment of
adolescent "consent" by the United States civil and criminal systems,
one might argue for the maintenance of the status quo. No such
advantage exists, however. The systems have evolved inconsistently and
incongruently. The only justifying explanation for affording adolescent
"consent" legal significance, seen in the civil case law, centers on the
360. Without the special facts in Sara's case, including the age disparity and Cosio's managerial
position, eleven more states join the list: (14) Iowa; (15) Colorado; (16) Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, and Washington. See App. A,
infra pp. 546-73. In Colorado, the Bohrer court found consent irrelevant because of the prohibition
regarding the sexual violation of a minor by an adult in a position of trust. Bohrer v. DeHart, 943
P.2d 1220, 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). It is not clear that a Colorado court would find that Sara's
manager held a position of trust. Additionally, in Bostic, the plaintiff was fifteen when her
relationship with her coach commenced. Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL
723262, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003). The Delaware court found that the coach held a position of
trust. Thus, the court found consent irrelevant. id. at *6.
361. 495 N.W.2d 327 (Wis. 1993).
362. Id. at 329.
363. Angie M. v. Hiemstra, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
364. Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
365. Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
366. The age of consent in the remaining eleven states are: (17) Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, and Texas; (18) Arizona, Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia. See App.
A, infra pp. 546-73.
Washington Law Review
need in civil cases to evaluate the existence and extent of a plaintiffs
damages. As the discussion of Mama Taori's indicates, however,
consent does not measure or even indicate damages. Alternative avenues
for the exploration of a plaintiffs injuries exist. Thus, the critical
evaluation of the plaintiffs injuries cannot justify treatment of
adolescent "consent" that is inconsistent with the criminal statutory rape
scheme or with conclusions based on scientific evidence regarding
367adolescent development.
Public policy concerning the treatment of adolescent "consent"
deserves attention and revision. Scientific evidence and social science
studies should inform the revision to secure for minors a standard that
properly accounts for their constitutional liberties as well as their
developmental abilities. I cannot endorse the maintenance of the status
quo. It is simply too illogical and provides too little protection for
developing teenagers. Moreover, it perpetuates outdated moral
judgments concerning non-marital and homosexual sex, as well as
stereotypical attitudes about "good" girls and boys.
A. State Statutory Rape Laws and the Rule of Sevens
State statutory rape laws also fail to provide adequate direction for the
treatment of adolescent "consent." The first problem with reliance on
statutory rape laws rests on the fact that "the age of consent" varies from
state to state and from statute to statute within states.368 "So what?"
states rights advocates might ask. They might argue that individual states
should enjoy the right to set the age of consent as local judgment
dictates. The appropriate response is that scientific evidence does not
suggest that minors in Colorado develop physically, emotionally, and
mentally any earlier than do those in California or New York. We are
talking about developmental capacity, not about moral judgments
concerning sex or local attitudes about "deviant" sexual behavior. It
makes no logical sense to permit multiple and inconsistent
367. See Drobac, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 257, at 928-30.
Scott and Steinberg caution:
Psycho-social development proceeds more slowly than cognitive development. As a
consequence, even when adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful
decisionmaking may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most
relevant to differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and
perception of risk, (c) temporal perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 257, at 813.
368. See App. A, infra pp. 546-73.
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determinations of adolescent capacity absent some accurate maturity
test. Moreover, Justice Jones' footnote in Taylor reminds us that these
inconsistent statutory rape laws potentially create a constitutional
offense in some states where the conduct is not criminal.369
Second, I doubt state legislatures passed statutory rape laws in
reliance on medical research regarding adolescent developmental
capabilities. These laws have been on the books for decades. We should
invest the resources necessary to complete scientific research regarding
adolescent capabilities and then implement an appropriate national
standard based upon reliable scientific evidence. If states want to choose
an age of consent higher than that indicated by scientific evidence, then
let the states' rights versus individual rights debate ensue.
The same reliance on science addresses the archaic rule of sevens and
the mature minors doctrine. Until we know that fourteen-year-olds
possess the same ability as adults to make reasoned decisions and
judgments in unfamiliar circumstances, or under stress, we should
presume them incapable and protect our older children from sexual
abuse. If we must adopt a bright-line, because we have no sure measure
of individual cognitive, neuro-psycho-social maturity, the age of
majority better serves us.
B. Teenagers on Trial
One alternative to the bright-line drawing, accomplished by ages of
consent, necessitates the case-by-case evaluation of the plaintiffs
maturity. Presumptions, either for or against capacity, also inevitably
devolve into such an analysis since the side disadvantaged by the
presumption will try to challenge it. Either way, the evaluation puts the
teen on trial.
A trial of the teenager's maturity raises several serious concerns.
First, the evaluation typically will occur months (if not years) after the
teenager "consented." Therefore, no objective test can accurately
evaluate the teenager's maturity as it existed at the time of the
"consent.', 370 Anyone who has bought shoes for a teenager knows that
adolescents mature and grow with astonishing rapidity. A teenager who
"consents" in April may demonstrate a very different level of maturity
than he or she will in December, or years later. Fairness dictates that we
369. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,479 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., dissenting).
370. See supra note 267.
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not use the level of maturity that he or she exhibits during trial or
discovery to judge capacity at the time of alleged injurious events.
Second, the indicators that we use to gauge teenager maturity may
subject that teenager to humiliating, prejudicial, and perhaps even
unconstitutional scrutiny. For example, the defense may attempt to
introduce evidence of prior sexual activity to demonstrate a teenager's
maturity. While federal sexual harassment law and rules of evidence37'
regulate the use of the plaintiffs sexual history, exceptions allow
introduction of that evidence when the plaintiff places the issue in
controversy or for other reasons during civil trials.372 Defense counsel
may argue that the claim of incapacity places the plaintiffs maturity,
and therefore her sexual history, in controversy. Conceivably, a court
could allow the introduction of the plaintiffs history of sexual abuse or
incest survival to demonstrate that the plaintiff was aware of the
difference between consensual and offensive or coerced sex. Even the
threat of such admission or discovery of such evidence might deter some
teenagers, and their parents, from prosecuting civil claims.
Third, juveniles risk that a judge and jurors will blame them (the
teenagers) for not being more mentally mature when they look
physically mature or for bringing their injuries upon themselves with
their immaturity. One might argue that jurors can resist the temptation to
blame the victim. Think about how many times, however, you have
thought to yourself, "Oh, that is so immature!" If behavior is truly the
product of immaturity, there should be no associated "blame." A person
cannot help his or her immaturity. Immaturity is a natural stage of
development. We do not condemn the mentally challenged for their
failure to comprehend. Similarly, we should not blame the immature for
their failure to act maturely. However, we do all the time.
Associated with this argument concerning blame, one might suggest
that even though we should not censure adolescents for their immaturity,
neither should we protect them from the consequences of their behavior.
How else are people to learn if they do not suffer the consequences of
their behavior? I offer two responses to this question. First, teenagers do
not "consent" to what we would otherwise label sexual harassment in
isolation. The controversial conduct always involves another person, a
co-worker or supervisor. I will guess that this second person is usually
371. FED. R.EVID.412.
372. See supra notes 297-98, 307 and accompanying text.
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an adult.373 That adult has the power to prevent the harm by refusing to
become sexually involved with the minor. But for the willing assistance
of the adult, the harm would not occur. Thus, I would hold the adult
responsible for the consequential damages.
My second response to the imposition of consequences borrows from
common parenting wisdom. When a child reaches for the hot pot and
burns himself, we do not refuse to treat the burn so that the child will
learn a lesson and refrain from grabbing pots on the stove. The pain of
the moment should deter the child in the future. Neither do we consider a
bandage and dressing a reward for bad behavior. Finally, we would not
hesitate to scream "Stop!" at the child to prevent the injury in the first
place. Take this simple example and apply it to teenager-adult workplace
sex. When a teenager suffers injury from teenager-adult workplace sex,
we should not hesitate to compensate the injury. The teenager is injured
through no fault of his own because he did not have capacity to consent.
We should not view the compensatory monetary payment to be a reward
for bad behavior. The money is not an "award," even if we use that term
in legal parlance. Lastly, we should not hesitate to yell "Stop!" to
prevent workplace teen-adult sex that traumatizes and injures adolescent
workers.
C. Strict Liability-Law Reform and Legal Regulation
The best way to prevent workplace sexual harassment of teenagers
involves the implementation of both regulatory mechanisms and
statutory reform. First, sexual harassment of minors by adults must
become a strict liability offense for which consent is no defense.
Lawmakers should amend Title VII, state FEPS, and tort law to account
for adolescent workers, their developmental abilities, and the
phenomenon of their sexual exploitation.374 Research evidence regarding
adolescent development and sexual harassment of minors should inform
and guide statutory reform.
373. If the sexual partner is another adolescent, I would deny recovery since neither teenager has
acquired the capacity to consent. Each would bear his or her own costs, unless the employer knew
or should have known of the conduct. In that case, I would hold the employer liable under a
negligence standard for failing to prevent and cure sexual harassment. Similarly, if the second
adolescent is a supervisor, I would impose liability on the employer because the employer has made
an adolescent its supervising agent. In that case, the employer should bear the burden of that
decision and pay for the resulting damages caused by its agent.
374. I would also support the amendment to Title IX to address the issues raised in this Article as
they pertain to sexual harassment of minors by adults at school.
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Strict liability will serve many of the public policy concerns raised in
this Article. It will ensure the development by employers of appropriate
workplace policies and procedures to prevent and cure the sexual
predation of adolescents on the job. Strict liability, and the necessarily
related exclusion of consent evidence,375 will lead to cost redistribution.
It will lift the financial burden of sexual harassment injuries from minors
and their parents. Sexual predators responsible for the injuries will bear
the costs. Employers who regulate the workplace and reap the rewards of
adolescent labor will share in carrying the cost burden. Moreover,
employers can purchase employment practice liability insurance to
spread the cost burden further. Strict tort and antidiscrimination law
liability will redress the social grievance of the subordination of this
nation's working youth. Such laws will attack the treatment of
adolescents as fungible.
In addition to law reform, education and regulatory mechanisms could
address this problem. For example, some states subsidize the
employment of young workers.376 State employment departments could
mandate that in exchange for tax breaks or other benefits received,
employers provide special training for adolescent workers regarding
workplace rights and sexual harassment. Additionally, states might
require that to obtain a permit to work, adolescent applicants must
complete a sexual harassment training seminar. State education
departments might also add sexual harassment curricula to their health
and business administration classes. These are just a few of the possible
regulatory approaches.
A strict liability scheme and regulatory mechanisms are compatible
with affording adolescents some measure of autonomy and self-
determination. An adolescent might still choose to engage in sex with an
adult co-worker, who would still run the risk of civil and criminal
liability. In essence, this scheme operates like adolescent "consent" to a
contract. The sex "contract" is voidable by the adolescent but not void.
The adolescent can retract the consent if she realizes during her minority
375. 1 would consider making evidence of consent admissible in any second (or successive) trial
for money damages if the minor had successfully sued for similar injuries on a prior occasion. Such
a rule should satisfy those skeptics who will argue that adolescent seductresses will win their
fortunes from multiple unsuspecting employers. Additionally, once an injured adolescent has
received her recovery and "learned the lesson," she should not need the same protection, funded by
an employer, as one who is inexperienced and naive.
376. 1 thank Professor Cynthia Baker who educated me on this point.
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(or shortly thereafter)377 that her adult partner took advantage of her
"developing capacity" at the workplace.
One might argue that if law imposed strict liability on employers for
the sexual harassment of adolescent workers by supervisors, employers
would simply stop hiring adolescents. Teenagers would face even higher
unemployment rates. I challenge that criticism. Employers can pay
adolescent workers less money for the same work performed by adults.
Often employers avoid providing part-time adolescent employees
benefits that adult workers receive. It makes good business sense to hire
young, seasonal, or part-time workers. I doubt that the cost of sexual
harassment judgments and training would exceed the financial
advantages employers enjoy by employing adolescents-if those
employers implemented age-appropriate policies and proper training.
Holding employers strictly liable for the sexual exploitation of their
minor workers would not shut down the markets of this nation.
Sara and the other Does of this nation deserve our protection as they
transition to adulthood. These minors mature and develop full capacity
through work and other life experiences. As they mature, we should
continue to shield them from the humiliating, devastating trauma of
sexual exploitation in the workplace. American tort and sexual
harassment laws fail our nation's working youth. If we ignore the
conflict of laws that deny our adolescent children protection and
recovery, then their seduction is our sin.
377. 1 would advocate an appropriate limitations period for suit and recovery. See Oberman,
supra note 83, at 782-83 (noting the tolling of the reporting time limitation under some statutory
rape statutes until the victim reaches her majority).
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APPENDIX A*
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61
Rape, 1st degree
Gender neutral, but must
be with member of
opposite sex. Perpetrator
(Perp): 16 or older;
Target (Targ): under 12.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 Gender neutral, but must
Rape, 2nd degree be with member of
opposite sex. Perp: 16 or
older; Targ: 12-15 plus 2
yr. age diff.
**Phipps (16)
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63 Gender neutral. Perp: 16
Sodomy, 2nd degree or older; Targ: under 12.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-64
Sodomy, 2nd dejzree
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65
Sexual misconduct
Gender neutral. Perp: 16
or older; Tarm: 12-15.
Gender neutral, but must
be with member of
opposite sex. No age
specified. (This is the
statutory rave section.)
* I thank Sandie McCarthy-Brown for her excellent research and work on this table. The statutes
to which Phipps cites are noted in the comment column with the comment "**Phipps." The age of
consent Phipps claims for each state is in parenthesis after his name. Phipps, supra note 75, at 441
app. A. All statutes are current on Westlaw as of February, 2004.
Alabama
16
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
Alaska
16/18
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.436
Sexual Abuse of a
minor, 2nd degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 16
or older; Targ: under 13;
Targ: 13-15 plus 3 yr.
age diff.
Perp: 18 or older; Targ:
under 18 plus family
relationship.
Perp: 18 or older plus in
a position of authority
over target; Targ: under
16.
**Phipps (16)
ALASKA STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 16
§ 11.41.438 or older; Targ: 13-15
Sexual Abuse of a plus 3 yr. age diff.
minor, 3rd degree Perp: 18 or older plus in
a position of authority;
Targ: 16-17 plus 3 yr.
age diff.
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.440
Sexual Abuse of a
minor, 4th degree
Gender neutral. Perp:
under 16; Targ: under 13
plus 3 yr. age diff.
Perp: 18 or older plus in
a position of authority;
Targ: 16-17 plus 3 yr.
age diff.
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ: 15
18 § 13-1404 or older w/out consent or
Sexual abuse under 15 if only female
breast involved.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 13-1405 under 18.
Sexual conduct with a **Phipps (18)
minor
STATE CODE & COMMENTAGE OF CONSENT
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-103
Rape
Gender neutral.
Targ: under 14 plus 3 yr.
age diff.
Targ: under 18 plus
family relation plus 3 yr.
age diff.
ARK. CODE ANN. Gender neutral.
§ 5-14-110 Perp: 18 or older; Targ:
Sexual indecency with a under 15 plus 3 yr. age
child diff.
ARK. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 5-14-124 under 18 plus perp. is in
Sexual assault, 1 st position of authority.
degree
ARK. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Perp:
§ 5-14-126 under 18; Targ: under 14
Sexual assault in the 3rd plus 3 yr. age diff.
degree I
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-127
Sexual assault in the 4th
degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 20
or older; Targ: under 16.
(This is the statutory rape
code.)
**Phipps (16)
California CAL. PENAL CODE Gender neutral.
18 § 261.5 Variations in level of
Unlawful sexual punishment according to
intercourse with person age of target.
under 18 Targ: under 18.
**Phipps (18)
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
15/18 § 18-3-402 under 15 plus 4 yr. age
Sexual assault diff.; Targ: 15-16 plus
10 yr. age diff.
**Phipps (17)
COLO. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18-3-404 under 18.
Unlawful sexual contact
Arkansas
16/18
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
COLO. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18-3-405 under 15 plus 4 yr. age
Sexual assault on a child diff.
COLO. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18-3-405.3 under 18 plus perp. is in
Sexual assault of a child position of trust.
by one in a position of
trust
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
16/18 § 53a-71 13-15 plus 2 yr. age
Sexual assault in the 2nd diff.; Targ: under 18 plus
degree perp. is target's guardian.
**Phipps (16)
CONN. GEN. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 53a-70 under 13 plus 2 yr. age
Sexual assault in the 1st diff.
degree
CONN. GEN. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 53a-73a under 15.; Targ: under
Sexual assault in the 4th 18 plus perp. is target's
degree guardian.
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, Masculine includes the
16/18 § 223 feminine.
Gender/ Number
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 770 under 16.
Rape in the 4th degree Perp: 30 and over; Targ:
under 18; Targ: 16-17
plus perp. in position of
authority.
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT________
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 771
Rape in the 3rd degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16 plus 10 yr. age
diff. or perp. causes
physical injury or serious
mental or emotional
injury.
Perp: 19 or older; Targ:
under 14.
**Phipps (16)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 773 older; Targ: under 12;
Rape, 1 st degree Targ: under 16 plus perp.
in position of authority
or perp. inflicts serious
physical injury.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 772 under 16 plus perp.
Rape, 2nd degree causes serious physical
injury or uses deadly
weapon or dangerous
instrument.
Perp: 18 or older; Targ:
under 12; Targ: under 16
plus perp. in position of
authority.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 768 under 16.
Unlawful sexual contact,
2nd degree
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 762(b)
Gender
"Unless a contrary
meaning is clearly
required, the male
pronoun shall be deemed
to refer to both male and
female."
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 761
Definitions
D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3001
Definitions
D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3008
1 st degree child sexual
abuse
D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3009
2nd degree child sexual
abuse
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.04
Lewd or lascivious
offenses committed
upon or in the presence
of persons less than 16
years of age
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011
Sexual battery
"(j) A child who has not
yet reached his or her
sixteenth birthday is
deemed unable to
consent to a sexual act
with a person more than
4 years older than said
child. Children who have
not yet reached their
twelfth birthday are
deemed unable to
consent to a sexual act
under any
circumstances."
"'Child' means a person
who has not yet attained
the age of 16 years."
Targ: under 16.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16 plus 4 yr. age
diff.
Gender neutral. under 16
plus 4 yr. age diff.
Gender neutral. Diff.
punishment if perp. is
over/under 18; Targ: 12-
15 or under 16.
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: under 12
plus injury to sexual
organs; Targ: age 12 or
older without consent.
D.C.
16
Florida
16/18
i-
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
FLA. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Perp: 24
§ 794.05 or older; Targ: 16 or 17.
Unlawful sexual activity **Phipps (18)
with certain minors
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. Gender neutral.
16 § 16-6-3 Different punishment if
Statutory Rape perp. is under/over 21;
Targ: under 16.
**Phipps (16)
Hawaii HAW. REv. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
14/16 § 707-730 under 14; Targ: 14-15
Sexual assault, 1 st plus 5 yr. age diff.
degree **Phipps (16)
HAW. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 707-732 under 14; Targ: age 14-
Sexual assault, 3rd 15 plus 5 yr. age diff.
degree
IDAHO CODE § 18-1506
Sex abuse of child under
age 16
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: under 16.
IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 Gender neutral. Targ:
Lewd conduct with a under 16.
minor
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 This code section
Rape specifies that "rape" can
only be committed by a
male and only a female
may be a target.
Female: under/over 18.
**Phipps (18)
IDAHO CODE § 18-6108
Male Rape
This code section
specifies that "male
rape" can only be
committed by a male and
only a male may be a
target.
No age specified.
Idaho
18
w
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12-13
Criminal Sexual Assault
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 18 plus perp. is
family member.
Perp: 17 yrs or older plus
in position of authority;
Targ: 13-17.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 17
5/11-6 or older; Targ: under 17.
Indecent Solicitation Of
A Child
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
5/12-16 under 18 plus perp. is
Aggravated Criminal family member.
Sexual Abuse Perp: over 17; Targ:
under 13.
Perp: 17 or older plus in
position of authority,
trust, etc.; Targ: 13-17.
Perp: 17 or older plus
used force or threat of
force; Targ: 13-16.
Perp: under 17;.Targ:
13-16 plus 5 yr. age
diff.; Targ: under 9.
Perp: under 17 plus use
of force or threat of use
of force; Targ: 9-16.
**Phipps (17)
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 17
5/12-14.1 or older; Targ: under 13.
Predatory sexual assault
of child
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12-15
Sexual abuse
Gender neutral. Perp:
under 17; Targ: 9-16;
Targ: 13-16 plus less
than 5 yr. age diff.
Illinois
17/18
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3
Child molesting
Gender neutral. Diff.
punishment if perp. is
under/over 21; Targ:
under 14.
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-5 Gender neutral. Perp: 18
Vicarious sexual or older; Targ: under 14.
gratification
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-6 Gender neutral. Perp: 18
Child solicitation or older; Targ: under 14.
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-9 Gender neutral. Perp: 18
Sexual misconduct with or older; Targ: 14-15.
a minor **Phipps (16)
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1
Rape
IOWA CODE § 702.5
Definition of "Child"
Must be with "member
of the opposite sex."
No age specified.
Targ: under 14.
IOWA CODE § 709.3 Gender neutral. Targ:
Sexual abuse, 2nd under 12.
degree
IOWA CODE § 709.4 Gender neutral. Targ:
Sexual abuse, 3rd degree 12-13; Targ: 14-15 plus
family relationship,
position of authority, or
4 yr. age diff.
**Phipps (16)
IOWA CODE § 709.12 Gender neutral. Perp: 18
Indecent contact or older or 16-17 plus 5
yr. age diff.; Targ: under
14.
IOWA CODE § 709.14
Lascivious conduct with
a minor
Gender neutral. Perp:
over 18 plus in a position
of authority; Targ: under
Indiana
16
Iowa
14/18
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
16 § 21-3502 under 14.
Rape
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
-AGE OF CONSENT__ ______
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3503
Indecent liberties
(touching)
Gender neutral. Targ:
14-15.
KAN. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 21-3504 14-15.
Aggravated indecent **Phipps (15)
liberties with a child
(penetration)
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3510
Solicitation of a child
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510
References and
Annotations
Gender neutral. Targ:
14-15.
Explanation of
legislative age choices
(ages 12, 14, & 16). Age
of full consent: 16.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.040 gender neutral due to Ky.
Rape, 1 st degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Targ: under
12.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.050 gender neutral due to Ky.
Rape, 2nd degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Perp: 18 or
older; Targ: under 14.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.060 gender neutral due to Ky.
Rape, 3rd degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Perp: 21 or
older; Targ: under 16.
**Phipps (16)
KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.020
Lack of consent
Gender neutral. Targ:
incapable of consenting
when under 16.
Kentucky
16
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STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.070
Sodomy, 1st degree
Written in masculine, but
gender neutral due to Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Targ: under
12.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.080 gender neutral due to Ky.
Sodomy, 2nd degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Perp: 18 or
older; Targ: under 14.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.090 gender neutral due to Ky.
Sodomy, 3rd degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Perp: 21 or
older; Targ: under 16.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.110 gender neutral due to Ky.
Sexual abuse, 1 st degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Targ: under
12.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.120 gender neutral due to Ky.
Sexual abuse, 2nd Rev. Stat. Ann.
degree § 446.020. Targ: under
14.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Written in masculine, but
§ 510.130 gender neutral due to Ky.
Sexual abuse, 3rd degree Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.020. Targ: 14-15
plus 5 yr. age diff.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 446.020
Gender & number
Use of the masculine
includes the feminine
unless otherwise
indicated.
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
17 § 14:81 under 17 plus 3 yr. age
Indecent behavior with a diff.
juvenile
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Perp:
§ 14:81.2 over 17; Targ: under 17
Molestation of a juvenile plus 3 yr. age diff. plus
use of force,
intimidation, or position
of authority.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Perp: 19
§ 14:80 yrs or older; Targ: 12-
Felony carnal 16.
knowledge of a juvenile Perp: 17 or older; Targ:
12-14.
**Phipps (17)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Perp:
§ 14:80.1 17-18; Targ: 15-16 plus
Misdemeanor carnal 3 yr. age diff.
knowledge of a juvenile
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 14:43.3 under 15 plus 3 yr. age
Oral sexual battery diff.
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
14/18 tit. 17-A, § 253 under 14; Targ: 18 if
Gross sexual assault perp. has supervisory or
disciplinary control.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral.
tit. 17-A, § 254 Targ: 14-15 plus 5 yr.
age diff.
Perp: 21; Targ: 16-17
plus perp. is school
personnel in target's
school
**Phipps (16)
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., Gender neutral, but must
14/16 CRIMINAL LAW § 3-304 involve a vagina.
Rape 2nd degree Targ: under 14 plus 4 yr.
age diff.
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
Massachusetts
16
MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 3-306
Sexual offense 2nd
degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 14 plus 4 yr. age
diff.
MD. CODE ANN., Gender neutral.
CRIMINAL LAW § 3-307 Targ: under 14 plus 4 yr.
Sexual offense, 3rd age diff.
degree Perp: 21 or older; Targ:
14-15
**Phipps (15)
MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 3-308
Sexual offense, 4th
degree
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 265, § 22A
Rape of a child
Gender neutral but must
involve a vagina.
Targ: 14-15 plus 4 yr.
age diff.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16 plus force or
threat used.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
ch. 265, § 23 under 16.
Rape and Abuse of a **Phipps (16)
child
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
ch. 265, § 24B under 16.
Assault of child; intent
to rape
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272 § 4
Inducing persons under
eighteen to have sexual
intercourse
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 18 but must be of
"chaste life." [I do not
consider this a protective
statute since it leaves the
target open to a trial
regarding her sexual
history.]
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS Gender neutral. Targ:
16/18 § 750.520b under 13; Targ: 13-15
Criminal Sexual plus perp. in position of
Conduct, 1st degree authority.
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MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520c
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 2nd degree
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520d
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 3rd degree
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520e
Criminal Sexual
Conduct 4th degree
I. *
MINN. STAT. § 609.342
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 1st degree
MINN. STAT. § 609.343
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 2nd degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13; Targ: 13-15
plus Perp. in position of
authority.
Gender neutral. Targ:
13-15; Targ: 16-17 plus
perp. is school personnel
in target's school.
**Phiops (16)
Gender neutral. Targ:
13-15 plus 5 yr. age
diff.; Targ: 16-17 plus
perp. is school personnel
in target's school
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13 plus 36 mo. age
diff.; Targ: 13-15 plus
48 mo. age diff. plus
perp. is in position of
authority; Targ: under 16
plus perp. has
"significant relationship"
to target plus force or
coercion used.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13 plus 36 mo. age
diff.; Targ: 13-15 plus
48 mo. age diff. plus
perp. is in position of
authority; Targ: under 16
plus perp. has
"significant relationship"
to target plus force or
coercion used.
Minnesota
16/18
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT________
MINN. STAT. § 609.344
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 3rd degree
MINN. STAT. § 609.345
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 4th degree
MINN. STAT. § 609.3451
Criminal Sexual
Conduct, 5th degree
MINN. STAT. § 609.352
Solicitation of Children
to Engage in Sexual
Conduct
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13 plus 36 mo. age
diff.; Targ: 13-15 plus
24 mo. age diff.; Targ:
16-17 plus 48 mo. age
diff. plus perp. is in
position of authority;
Targ: 16-17 plus
significant relationship to
perp.
**Phipps (16)
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13 plus 36 mo. age
diff.; Targ: 13-15 plus
48 mo. age diff. or perp.
is in position of
authority; Targ: 16-17
plus 48 mo. age diff. plus
perp. is in position of
authority; Targ: 16-17
plus significant
relationship to perp.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16.
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: 15 and
under.
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Perp: 17
14/16 § 97-3-65 or older; Targ: 14-15
Statutory Rape plus 36 mo. age diff.;
Targ: under 14 plus 24
mo. age diff. **Phipps
(17)
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Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 566.032
Statutory Rape, 1st
degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 14.
MO. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 21
§ 566.034 or older; Targ: under 17.
Statutory Rape, 2nd **Phipps (17)
degree
Mo. REv. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 566.062 under 14.
Statutory Sodomy, 1st
degree
Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 566.064
Statutory Sodomy, 2nd
degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 21
or older; Targ: under 17.
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
16 § 45-5-501 under 16.
Definitions **Phipps (16)
MONT. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 45-5-502 any age.
Sexual assault
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 19
17 § 28-319 or older; Targ: under 16.
Sexual assault, 1 st **Phipps (16)
degree
NEB. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. No age
§ 28-320 specified.
Sexual assault, 2nd or
3rd degree
NEB. REv. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 19
§ 28-320.01 or older; Targ: 14 and
Sexual assault of a child under.
NEB. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 28-805 or older; Targ: under 17.
Debauching a minor
Missouri
17
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Specifies
16 § 200.368 age of perpetrator.
Statutory sexual **Phipps (16)
seduction: Penalties
NEV. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 200.364 or older; Targ: under 16.
Definitions **Phipps (16)
New N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
Hampshire § 632-A:2 under 13; Targ: 13-15
16/18 Aggravated felonious plus perp. lives in same
sexual assault household or family
relation; Targ: 13-17
plus perp. in position of
authority.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 632-A:3 13-15 yrs plus
Felonious sexual assault penetration; Targ: under
13, contact only.
**Phipps (16)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ: 13
§ 632-A:4 and over; Targ: 13-15
Sexual assault plus age diff. of 3 yrs. or
fewer.
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. No age
16/18 § 2C:14-1 specified.
Definitions
N.J. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 2C:14-2 under 13; Targ: 13-15
Sexual assault plus family relation or
perp. in position of
authority or 4 yr. age
diff.; Targ: 16-17 plus
family relation or perp.
in position of authority.
**Phipps (16)
N.J. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 2C:14-4 under 13 plus 4 yr. age
Lewdness (exposure) diff.
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New Mexico
17/18
New York
17
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-11
Criminal sexual
penetration
Gender neutral.
Targ: under 13; Targ:
13-18 plus position of
authority.
Perp: 18 or older plus 4
yr. age diff.; Targ: 13-
16; Targ: 13-18 plus
perp. is school personnel
in target's school.
**Phipps (16)
N.M. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ: 18
§ 30-9-12 and over plus no consent.
Criminal sexual contact
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-13
Criminal sexual contact
w/ a minor
N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.05
Sexual offense: lack of
consent
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13; Targ: 13-18
plus perp. in position of
authority.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 17.
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Perp: 21
§ 130.25 or older; Targ: under 17.
Rape, 3rd degree **Phipps (17)
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 130.30 or older; Targ: under 15.
Rape, 2nd degree
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Perp: 21
§ 130.40 or older; Targ: under 17.
Criminal sex act, 3rd
degree
N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.45
Criminal sex act, 2nd
degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: under 15
plus 4 yr. age diff.
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT ________
N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.50
Criminal sex act, 1st
degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 11.
Perp: 18 or older; Targ:
under 13.
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 130.70 under 11.
Aggravated sexual (Legislation changing
abuse, 1 st degree ages is pending: 2003
New York Senate Bill
No. 5278)
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 130.60 under 14.
Sexual abuse, 2nd
degree
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 130.65 under 11.
Sexual abuse, 3rd degree
N.Y. PENAL LAW Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 130.66 under 11.
Aggravated sexual (Legislation changing
abuse, 3rd degree ages is pending: 2003
New York Senate Bill
No. 5278)
N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.67
Aggravated sexual
abuse, 2nd degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 11.
(Legislation changing
ages is pending: 2003
New York Senate Bill
No. 5278)
North N.C. GEN. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
Carolina § 14-27.7A 13-15 plus 6 yr. age diff.
16 Statutory rape or sexual **Phipps (16)
offense
N.C. GEN. STAT. Gender neutral. Perp: 12
§ 14-27.2 or older; Targ: under 13
Rape, 1st degree plus 4 yr. age diff.
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North Dakota
18
Ohio
16
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.4
Sexual offense, 1st
degree
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-03
Gross sexual imposition
Gender neutral. Perp: 12
or older; Targ: under 13
plus 4 yr. age diff.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 15.
N.D. CENT. CODE Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 12.1-20-03.1 under 15.
Continuous sexual abuse
of child
N.D. CENT. CODE Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 12.1-20-05 or older; Targ: 15-17.
Corruption or Perp: 18 or older; Targ:
solicitation of minor under 15.
Perp: 22 or older; Targ:
15-17.
**Phipps (15)
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-07
Sexual assault
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.01
Definitions
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: 15-17.
"Minor" means under
age 18;"juvenile" means
under 18.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 2907.04 or older; Targ: 13-15.
Unlawful sex. conduct **Phipps (16)
with a minor
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 2907.05 under 13.
Gross sexual imposition .
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.06
Sexual imposition
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: 13-15
plus 4 yr. aae diff.
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
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OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 1111
Definitions
Gender neutral rape.
Targ: under 16; Targ:
16-18 plus perp. is
school personnel in
target's school.
**Phipps (15)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 1114 or older; Targ: under 14.
Rape, 1 st degree & 2nd
degree
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 1123
Lewd or indecent
propositions or acts to a
child
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.315
Incapacity to consent
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 18.
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.355 under 16.
Rape, 3rd degree
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.365 under 14.
Rape, 2nd degree
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.375 under 12; Targ: under 16
Rape, 1st degree plus certain family
relationships.
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.385 under 16.
Sodomy, 3rd degree
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.395 under 14.
Sodomy, 2nd degree
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.405
Sodomy, 1st degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 12; Targ: under 16
plus certain family
relationships.
Oklahoma
16/18
Oregon
18
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OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.408
Unlawful sex.
Penetration, 2nd degree
Pennsylvania
16
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 14.
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.411 under 12.
Unlawful sex.
Penetration, 1st degree
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.415 under 18.
Sexual abuse, 3rd degree
OR. REV. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 163.427 under 14.
Sexual abuse, 1 st degree
OR. REV. STAT. "[O]pposite sex"
§ 163.435 requirement. Perp: 18 or
Contributing to the older; Targ: under 18.
sexual delinquency of a **Phipps (15)
minor
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.445
Sexual misconduct
18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3121
Rape of a child
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 18.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 3122.1 under 16 plus 4 yr. age
Statutory sexual assault diff.
**Phipps (16)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 3125 under 13; Targ: under 16
Aggravated indecent plus 4 yr. age diff.
assault I
18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3126
Indecent assault
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13; Targ: under 16
plus 4 yr. age diff.
Washington Law Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
Rhode Island
16
R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-6
Sexual assault 3rd
degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
14-15.
**Phipps (16)
R.I. GEN. LAWS Gender neutral. Targ: 14
§ 11-37-8.1 and under.
Child molestation 1st
degree
R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-8.3
Child molestation 2nd
degree
Gender neutral. Targ: 14
and under.
South S.C. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
Carolina § 16-3-655 under 11; Targ: 11-14;
14/16 Criminal sexual conduct 14-15 plus perp. is in a
with minors position of familial,
custodial or official
authority.
**Phipps (16)
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Gender neutral. Targ:
16/18 § 22-22-1 under 10; Targ: 10-15
Rape defined plus 3 yr. age diff.; Targ:
10-17 plus perp. is
parent's spouse or
former spouse.
**Phipps (16)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Gender neutral. Perp: 16
§ 22-22-7 or older; Targ: under 16.
Sexual contact with a
child
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Gender neutral. Perp: 16
§ 22-22-7.3 or under; Targ: under 16.
Sexual contact with a
child; misdemeanor
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 22-22-24.5 or older; Targ: under 18.
Solicitation of a minor
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Tennessee TENN. CODE. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
13/18 § 39-13-504 under 13.
Aggravated sexual
battery
TENN. CODE. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 39-13-506 age 13-17 plus 4 yr. age
Statutory rape diff.
**Phipps (18)
TENN. CODE. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 39-13-522 under 13.
Rape of a child
TENN. CODE. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 39-13-527 age 13-17 plus perp. in
Authority figure, sexual supervisory or
battery disciplinary position.
Texas TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
17 § 22.011 under 17.
Sexual assault **Phipps (17)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 22.021 under 17.
Aggravated sexual
assault
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Gender neutral. No age
§ 21.01 specified.
Definitions
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 21.11 under 17.
Indecency with a child
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
16/18 § 76-5-401 14-15.
Unlawful sex activity
with a minor
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 76-5-401.1 14-15 plus 7 yr. age diff.
Sexual abuse of a minor
Washington Law. Review
STATE CODE & COMMENT
AGE OF CONSENT
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-401.2
Unlawful sexual conduct
with a 16 or 17 old
Gender neutral. Targ:
16-17 plus 10 yr. age
diff.
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. No age
§ 76-5-402 specified.
Rape **Phipps (16)
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 76-5-402.1 under 14.
Rape of a child
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 76-5-402.3 under 14.
Object rape of a child
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 76-5-403.1 under 14.
Sodomy of a child
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ: 14
§ 76-5-404 and over.
Forcible sexual abuse
UTAH CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 76-5-404.1 under 14.
Sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-406
Sexual offense without
consent
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 14; Targ: under 18
plus certain family
relationships; Targ: 14-
17 plus 3 yr. age diff.
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, Gender neutral. Targ:
16/18 § 3252 under 16; Targ: under 18
Sexual assault plus certain family
relationships.
**Phipps (16)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 3253 and older; Targ: under
Aggravated sexual 10.
assault
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VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-61
Rape
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 13.
VA. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18.2-63 13-14.
Carnal knowledge of a
child
VA. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18.2-67.1 under 13.
Forcible sodomy
VA. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18.2-67.2 under 13.
Object sexual
penetration
VA. CODE ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 18.2-67.3 under 13. Targ: 13-14
Aggravated sexual plus use of force or
battery threat.
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-371
Causing or encouraging
acts rendering children
delinquent, abused, etc.;
penalty; abandoned
infant
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.073
Rape of a child, 1 st
degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 18
or older; Targ: "child" 15
or older.
**Phipps (18)
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 12 plus 24 mo. age
diff.
WASH. REV. CODE Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 9A.44.076 age 12-13 plus 36 mo.
Rape of a child, 2nd age diff.
degree
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.079
Rape of a child, 3rd
degree
Gender neutral. Targ:
age 14-15 plus 48 mo.
age diff.
**Phipps (16)
Virginia
18
Washington
16/18
STATE CODE & 
COMMENT
AGE OF C NSENT
Washington Law Review
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WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.083
Child molestation, 1st
degree
West Virginia
16
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 12 plus 36 mo. age
diff.
WASH. REV. CODE Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 9A.44.086 12-13 plus 36 mo. age
Child molestation, 2nd diff.
degree
WASH. REV. CODE Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 9A.44.089 14-15 plus 48 mo. age
Child molestation, 3rd diff.
degree
WASH. REV. CODE Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 9A.44.093 16-17 plus 60 mo. age
Sexual misconduct with diff., perp. in significant
a minor, 1 st degree relationship with target,
and perp. in supervisory
position over target.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.096
Sexual misconduct with
a minor, 2nd degree
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-2
Lack of consent
Gender neutral. Targ:
16-17.
Gender neutral. Targ:
under 16.
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 Gender neutral. Perp: 14
Sexual assault, 1st or older; Targ: 11 and
degree under.
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5 Gender neutral. Perp: 16
Sexual assault, 3rd or older; Targ: under 16
degree plus 4 yr. age diff.
**Phipps (16)
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-7
Sexual abuse, 1 st degree
Gender neutral. Perp: 14
or older; Targ: 11 and
under.
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W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-9 Gender neutral. Perp: 16
Sexual abuse, 3rd degree or older; Targ: under 16
plus 4 yr. age diff.
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 948.02 Gender neutral. Targ:
18 Sexual assault of a child under 13; Targ: under
16.
WIS. STAT. § 948.09 Gender neutral. Targ: 16
Sexual intercourse with and over.
a child **Phipps (16)
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral.
16 § 6-2-308
Criminality of conduct;
Victim's age
WYO. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Targ:
§ 6-2-303 under 12 plus 4 yr. age
Sexual assault, 2nd diff.
degree
WYO. STAT. ANN. Gender neutral. Perp: 18
§ 6-2-304 or older; Targ: under 14;
Sexual assault, 3rd Targ: under 16 plus 4 yr.
degree age diff.
I **Phipps (18)
574
